KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

More documents

Recommendations

Info

78 Kant's Logic Both conflicting propositions presuppose that the world as a whole is given and therefore must have a definite magnitude. However, the world as the totality of objects of a possible experience can never be given as a whole to any human understanding. The world could only then be given as a whole (although not to our understanding) if it were a thing in itself. Thus, in so far as we debate whether the world is finite or infinite, we presuppose that it is something given and thus that it can have a determinate magnitude. If the world as a whole is not given it need also not have a determinate magnitude, either finite or infinite. The apparently analytical opposition proves to be merely dialectical; the contradiction turns out to be a contrary opposition, as soon as the presupposition that the world is a thing in itself is dropped — a presupposition that grounded the tertium non datur in the conjunction of an affirmative and an infinite judgment. If, however, I take away this assumption, or this transcendental illusion, and deny that the world is a thing in itself, the contradictory opposition of the two assertions is converted into a merely dialectical opposition. Since the world does not exist in itself (independently of the regressive series of my representations), it exists neither as an in itself infinite nor as an in itself finite whole. It is only to be met with in the empirical regress of the series of appearances, and not as something in itself at all. Hence, if this series is always conditioned, then it is never completely given, and the world is not an unconditioned whole, and thus also does not exist as such a whole, either of infinite or of finite magnitude. (B*532-3) The solution to this (the first) antinomy shows that it is "merely dialectical, and that it is a conflict due to an illusion" (B534). It is here that we can see the true purpose of Kant's systematic use of the apagogical form of proof in the antinomies chapter. The resolution of the antinomy shows that both seemingly contradictory propositions are false, i.e. that the opposition is not contradictory but rather contrary. But both have supposedly been proved to be true. The solution is to be found in the form of proof: The proofs are not proofs at all, they are refutations of the respective counterpropositions. Only under the assumption, tertium non datur, can one interpret the refutation of the counterproposition as a proof of the proposition; and precisely this presupposition is shown by the contrariety to be false. With the falsehood of the presupposition all proofs become invalid while the refutations remain unaffected; and since the refutations are still valid, all theses and antitheses are thus false. If the proofs had been direct, they would continue to be
Tertium datur 79 valid, and the antinomy would be insoluble. Thus, it seems to me, that any interpretation that attempts to reconstruct the proofs by making them direct, misses the point from the start. In the "Doctrine of Method" at the end of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant draws consequences from the key role played by indirect proofs in the antinomies chapter: he bans this form of proof from philosophy. In the section on "The Discipline of Pure Reason in Regard to its Proofs," he remarks that reason's "proofs must never be apagogical, but always ostensive" (B817). The reason for this is that it often happens, that the two propositions contradict each other only under a subjective condition which is falsely treated as being objective; and since the condition is false, both can be false, without its being possible to infer from the falsity of the one to the truth of the other. (B*819) Let us briefly recapitulate the structure of the antinomy: a logical illusion can arise when two contrary (or subcontrary) 37 propositions appear to stand in contradiction or analytical opposition, so that it seems that one of the pair of conflicting propositions must be true and the other false, and that apagogical proof procedures would be legitimate. The resolution of the antinomy consists in showing that the opposition is not one of contradiction but rather a merely dialectical (synthetic, contrary) opposition. The illusion, insofar as it was ever really unavoidable (this must be taken up below), will presumably remain unavoidable even if one acknowledges the solution. At the beginning of the "Dialectics" Kant asserted Transcendental illusion, on the other hand, does not cease even after it has been detected and its invalidity clearly revealed by transcendental criticism (e.g. the illusion in the proposition: the world must have a beginning in time). (B353) Thus the difference between logical dialectic and transcendental dialectic lies not in the form of the opposition but rather in the inevitability of the illusion or of the presupposition that causes the illusion. What is transcendental in the antinomies lies not in the form of the apparent contradiction but in the presuppositions of the cosmological ideas. 37 The peculiarities of the "subcontrary" form of resolution will be dealt with in Section 2.5 below.
Page 1:
KANT’S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN B
Page 5 and 6:
Contents Acknowledgments...........
Page 7 and 8:
Acknowledgements vii This book pres
Page 9:
To My Parents M.M.M. and P.O.M.
Page 12 and 13:
2 Introduction fact the rejection o
Page 14 and 15:
4 Introduction almost exclusively c
Page 16 and 17:
6 Introduction reductionism as the
Page 18 and 19:
8 Theory of the Organism will be se
Page 20 and 21:
10 Theory of the Organism when he f
Page 22 and 23:
12 Theory of the Organism that this
Page 24 and 25:
14 Theory of the Organism not in an
Page 26 and 27:
16 Theory of the Organism formation
Page 28 and 29:
18 Theory of the Organism common sp
Page 30 and 31:
20 Theory of the Organism cated to
Page 32 and 33:
22 Theory of the Organism by these
Page 34 and 35:
24 Kant's Reading of Biology of the
Page 36 and 37:
26 Kant's Reading of Biology for in
Page 38 and 39: 28 Kant's Reading of Biology monly
Page 40 and 41: 30 Kant's Reading of Biology not be
Page 42 and 43: 32 Kant's Reading of Biology to ada
Page 44 and 45: 34 Analytic of Teleological Judgmen
Page 64 and 65: 54 Antinomies of Reason tent is par
Page 66 and 67: 56 Antinomies of Reason antinomies
Page 68 and 69: 58 Antinomies of Reason shows that
Page 70 and 71: 60 Antinomies of Reason categories
Page 72 and 73: 62 Antinomies of Reason "only condi
Page 74 and 75: 64 Antinomies of Reason described;
Page 76 and 77: 66 Kant's Logic For the true opposi
Page 78 and 79: 68 Kant's Logic outside the sphere
Page 80 and 81: 70 Kant's Logic In contrast to Lamb
Page 82 and 83: 72 Kant's Logic predicate under con
Page 84 and 85: 74 Kant's Logic other. We can thus
Page 86 and 87: 76 Kant's Logic then both conflicti
Page 90 and 91: 80 The Unconditioned and the Infini
Page 108 and 109: 98 Antinomy of Division Antithesis
Page 110 and 111: 100 Antinomy of Division justificat
Page 112 and 113: 102 Antinomy of Division and thus p
Page 114 and 115: 104 Antinomy of Division why it is
Page 116 and 117: 106 Antinomy of Division B552-53) g
Page 118 and 119: 108 Antinomy of Division "machine"
Page 120 and 121: 110 Antinomy of Freedom How far the
Page 122 and 123: 112 Antinomy of Freedom of momentum
Page 124 and 125: 114 Antinomy of Freedom the Third a
Page 126 and 127: 116 Antinomy of Freedom If Kant mea
Page 128 and 129: 118 Antinomy of Freedom phenomena i
Page 130 and 131: 120 Antinomy of Freedom In the Crit
Page 132 and 133: 122 Antinomy of Freedom must appear
Page 134 and 135: 124 Systematics of Antinomy I do no
Page 136 and 137: 126 Summary position proves to be n
Page 138 and 139:
128 Antinomy of Judgment An antinom
Page 140 and 141:
130 Antinomy of Judgment §74 The r
Page 142 and 143:
132 Antinomy of Judgment must have
Page 144 and 145:
134 Antinomy of Judgment dialectic.
Page 146 and 147:
136 Antinomy of Judgment we cannot
Page 148 and 149:
138 Interpretations of the Antinomy
Page 150 and 151:
Page 152 and 153:
Page 154 and 155:
Page 156 and 157:
Page 158 and 159:
Page 160 and 161:
Page 162 and 163:
152 Heuristic but Necessary Princip
Page 164 and 165:
Page 166 and 167:
Page 168 and 169:
Page 170 and 171:
Page 172 and 173:
162 Resolution of the Antinomy the
Page 174 and 175:
164 Resolution of the Antinomy know
Page 176 and 177:
166 Resolution of the Antinomy a wh
Page 178 and 179:
168 Resolution of the Antinomy able
Page 180 and 181:
170 Resolution of the Antinomy ous
Page 182 and 183:
172 Resolution of the Antinomy intr
Page 184 and 185:
174 Resolution of the Antinomy tion
Page 186 and 187:
176 Resolution of the Antinomy meth
Page 188 and 189:
178 Resolution of the Antinomy anyt
Page 190:
180 Summary acquainted with" a caus
Page 194 and 195:
184 Bibliography Bommersheim, Paul,
Page 196 and 197:
186 Bibliography Fraisse, Jean Clau
Page 198 and 199:
188 Bibliography Kraemer, Eric Russ
Page 200 and 201:
190 Bibliography & E. Mendelsohn) B
Page 202 and 203:
192 Bibliography Roretz, Karl, "Zur
Page 204 and 205:
194 Bibliography American and Conti
Page 206 and 207:
196 Index 144; 154; 167; 169; final
Page 208 and 209:
198 Index mere understanding 47; 13
show all

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?