KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

Summary 125
nomy is thus apparently not one "of pure reason" and in fact is also
not so named. This — the seventh — antinomy is called the "antinomy
of judgment" and has no faculty of the mind to which it
directly relates. The difference is important in that we should not
expect to find in this antinomy a conflict of reason with itself, as in
the antinomies of reason, but rather a conflict of judgment with
itself. The inevitability of the dialectical illusion cannot, for
instance, be traced back to the demand of reason for the unconditioned,
as is maintained for the antinomies of practical reason and
aesthetic judgment. It is also questionable whether the distinction
between phenomena and things in themselves will bring a solution
to this antinomy. Although the application of this figure of argument
to another area in the antinomy of judgment should display
some similarities to what we have seen in this chapter, there will
certainly be some differences due to the different kind of object to
which it is applied.
2.7 Summary
Three significant results of the analyses undertaken in this
chapter, which provide the basis for the subsequent investigation of
the antinomy of judgment, should be recalled to mind: 1) the "logic"
of the antinomies, 2) the presupposition of the conditioning of the
whole through the parts, and 3) the completeness of the systematics
of the antinomies of reason without any mention of an antinomy of
judgment.
1. A Kantian antinomy is an apparent contradiction between
two propositions that in equal measure make an unspoken and
ungrounded presupposition. This presupposition implies that the
Law of the Excluded Middle applies to them. In the Critique of Pure
Reason two conflicting predicates, which exhaust a range of incompatibility,
are attributed to a subject, whereby it is assumed that the
genus of which the two predicates are species may be attributed to
the subject. Under this presupposition both of the two conflicting
predications are then argued ad absurdum thus refuting the presupposition
(that the world is a thing in itself). If one disputes this
presupposition, then the tertium non datur no longer holds; the op-