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KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

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116 Antinomy of Freedom<br />

If Kant meant this example seriously, then we should expect<br />

to find in the resolution of the subcontrary antinomies an asymmetry<br />

between the seemingly contradictory propositions, such that<br />

one is simply true and the other merely possibly true. Let us return<br />

to the thesis and antithesis of the Third Antinomy in a "corrected"<br />

version:<br />

Thesis: Some things (intelligible entities) act spontaneously.<br />

Or: Some things (intelligible entities) have themselves no<br />

causes.<br />

Antithesis. No thing (object of experience) acts spontaneously.<br />

Or: All things (objects of experience) have a cause.<br />

Kant can interpret such propositions as subcontrary opposites<br />

because both can be true but both cannot be false. The reason for this<br />

lies, however, not in the logical form of the propositions but in their<br />

transcendental content. The antithesis is a synthetic judgment a<br />

priori; it is a priori true. The propositions cannot both be false<br />

because one of them is always true. On the other hand both can be<br />

true, since the thesis is a descriptive statement about the supersensible<br />

and thus can at least not be refuted.<br />

To resolve the antinomy of freedom, Kant must show that<br />

human freedom is a thing in itself and that it can in some intelligible<br />

sense 'act' in the phenomenal world.<br />

The Freedom of the Turnspit<br />

To understand Kant's proof of freedom, it will be useful first to<br />

examine his remarks at the end of the resolution of the Third<br />

Antinomy. There he explains what he originally wanted to demonstrate<br />

and what he claims to have shown. He emphasizes that, "our<br />

intention has not been to establish the reality of freedom as one of the<br />

faculties which contain the cause of the appearances of our sensible<br />

world" (B585-6). The objective reality of freedom cannot be proved<br />

of coordinates)' and 'The moon does not revolve on its axis for us (considered in<br />

reference to the surface of the earth)'. Between these judgments, too, the originally<br />

given contradiction would be resolved as far as the logical form is concerned."<br />

(emphasis P.M.) But this is precisely what Kant in fact means. It is certainly no<br />

accident that he chose a ("true") rotational motion as his illustration.

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