KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

150 Interpretations of the Antinomy
Kant actually believes that the antinomy that he has constructed is
resolved by such remarks, then he is certainly mistaken, as I have
shown in the discussion of Ernst Cassirer. The seeming contradiction
that Kant correctly sees in his concept of natural purpose, will
not disappear simply because he says that it is gone. Furthermore
the seemingly natural interpretation, which has traditionally been
dominant, does not in fact take Kant literally. Kant does not, for
instance, say that the antinomy is based on a confusion but rather
that the appearance or semblance (Anschein) of an antinomy is so
based. Let it be remembered that, although an antinomy in Kant's
system contains only a seeming contradiction, nonetheless at least
the semblance is supposed to be genuine and not just arbitrary or
optional. It may be asked whether the semblance of a seeming contradiction
is an antinomy or just a confusion. 2 0 Secondly, this
appearance of an antinomy is supposed to subsist between a
mechanical and a teleological way of explaining. However, in the
formal presentation of the antinomy — as we have seen — mechanism
is not opposed to teleology, but rather two propositions about
mechanism stand in opposition. And if we take the two constitutive
principles (C1 and C2) to be the antinomy, we have to admit that
teleology is not mentioned there at all (not even in parentheses).
Finally, the passage cited provides no solution to the difficulties
involved in the concept of natural purpose but only reports that a
solution has been given.
The result of the analysis of this second passage is just as dissatisfying
as that of the first: What Kant seems to mean is quite certainly
false. What he literally says is, while not false, also not
exactly enlightening; and we might with a certain amount of justification
think that he did not necessarily mean it that way. Thus,
either Kant wanted to say something false (the contradiction is gone)
and expressed himself somewhat imprecisely; or he wanted to say
something else and expressed himself somewhat unintelligibly. The
point for an interpretation of the work as a whole is the following: If
we interpret these passages as Kant scholars have traditionally
interpreted them, then the entire construction of the antinomy is
indeed really a false window. In this case there would in fact be no
20 This is precisely what Kant means by "scheinbare Antinomie" in Metaphysik
der Sitten, Ak 6,418; W 4,549-550. It must however be admitted that the same
phrase occurs in some ambiguous passages in connection with the Fourth
Antinomy; cf. B588, B768.