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KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

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2 Introduction<br />

fact the rejection of mechanism and reductionism not any particular<br />

positive doctrine. The question of the special status of the<br />

organism was already taken up in the great mechanistic systems of<br />

the 17th century and is still discussed under the heading of "reductionism"<br />

or "emergence" in general textbooks of the philosophy of<br />

science. Historically, it is mechanism that has always prevailed as<br />

a scientific approach; or in other words, it is anti-mechanism that<br />

has had to regroup and renew itself every generation: but it has<br />

always done so.<br />

Mechanism has always won out in biology because it is able to<br />

generate a clear and definite research program. In fact mechanism<br />

is nothing else but the metaphysical hypostasis of an analytical<br />

method which is unquestionably part of the repertoire of every biologist<br />

– including the anti-mechanists. This method, reduction or<br />

analysis, prescribes that phenomena are to be traced back to the<br />

properties and interactions of the parts of the system. If subsequently<br />

the original phenomenon can be produced experimentally to<br />

a sufficient degree of approximation, then it has successfully been<br />

explained. The opponents of mechanism among natural scientists<br />

seldom doubt that a successful reduction is a sufficient explanation<br />

but rather only that such a reduction is possible in a particular case<br />

or kind of case. From mechanism a concrete research program<br />

emerges, namely precisely the program that mechanism projects<br />

onto the structure of being. However, from the negation of this<br />

projection there emerges no substantially different program of<br />

research; thus the neo-vitalists and holists of this century are<br />

scarcely to be distinguished from their opponents in their experimental<br />

technique. The differences lie in the goals pursued and<br />

inferences drawn, not in the means applied.<br />

Philosophers of various schools have participated with or<br />

without invitation in this conflict and have taken one side or the<br />

other, supporting them with philosophical arguments. They have<br />

attacked the inability of mechanism to understand the organism or<br />

condemned the sterility of vitalism. Some few have analyzed the<br />

quarrel itself; among these Kant stands out.<br />

In one of the standard textbooks on philosophy of science<br />

Ernst Nagel's The Structure of Science, which takes the side of<br />

reductionism, two problem complexes are taken up, which are<br />

thought to cause some difficulties for reductionism: the prima facie<br />

purposiveness of life processes and the apparent impossibility of

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