KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
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2 Introduction<br />
fact the rejection of mechanism and reductionism not any particular<br />
positive doctrine. The question of the special status of the<br />
organism was already taken up in the great mechanistic systems of<br />
the 17th century and is still discussed under the heading of "reductionism"<br />
or "emergence" in general textbooks of the philosophy of<br />
science. Historically, it is mechanism that has always prevailed as<br />
a scientific approach; or in other words, it is anti-mechanism that<br />
has had to regroup and renew itself every generation: but it has<br />
always done so.<br />
Mechanism has always won out in biology because it is able to<br />
generate a clear and definite research program. In fact mechanism<br />
is nothing else but the metaphysical hypostasis of an analytical<br />
method which is unquestionably part of the repertoire of every biologist<br />
– including the anti-mechanists. This method, reduction or<br />
analysis, prescribes that phenomena are to be traced back to the<br />
properties and interactions of the parts of the system. If subsequently<br />
the original phenomenon can be produced experimentally to<br />
a sufficient degree of approximation, then it has successfully been<br />
explained. The opponents of mechanism among natural scientists<br />
seldom doubt that a successful reduction is a sufficient explanation<br />
but rather only that such a reduction is possible in a particular case<br />
or kind of case. From mechanism a concrete research program<br />
emerges, namely precisely the program that mechanism projects<br />
onto the structure of being. However, from the negation of this<br />
projection there emerges no substantially different program of<br />
research; thus the neo-vitalists and holists of this century are<br />
scarcely to be distinguished from their opponents in their experimental<br />
technique. The differences lie in the goals pursued and<br />
inferences drawn, not in the means applied.<br />
Philosophers of various schools have participated with or<br />
without invitation in this conflict and have taken one side or the<br />
other, supporting them with philosophical arguments. They have<br />
attacked the inability of mechanism to understand the organism or<br />
condemned the sterility of vitalism. Some few have analyzed the<br />
quarrel itself; among these Kant stands out.<br />
In one of the standard textbooks on philosophy of science<br />
Ernst Nagel's The Structure of Science, which takes the side of<br />
reductionism, two problem complexes are taken up, which are<br />
thought to cause some difficulties for reductionism: the prima facie<br />
purposiveness of life processes and the apparent impossibility of