KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

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164 Resolution of the Antinomy known empirical laws, then we look for further laws and need only presuppose a subjective purposiveness of nature for our activity of knowledge acquisition. An infinite understanding could, through a knowledge of all empirical laws, completely determine the concept of every particular, so that nothing accidental remained. The fact that we cannot do this but must rather rely on regulative principles of judgment is due to the finite character (limits) of our understanding not to its peculiar quality (constitution). The problem, however, also does not lie in the fact that our understanding must proceed from the universal to the particular, as some of Kant's remarks seem to suggest. For, all of the various kinds of understanding investigated by Kant in fact proceed from the universal to the particular. I shall show that the real problem of our mechanistic understanding lies not in the relation of universal to particular, but rather in the equating of this relationship with that of part to whole. 25 It is our peculiar ("mechanistic") manner of explanation that equates the subsumption of the particular under the general with the reduction of a whole to its parts. Kant explains this in a long paragraph in the middle of §77, which will be analyzed in detail below. To explain the mechanistic peculiarity of our understanding Kant takes up a tried and true method and introduces a contrast understanding: he imagines a different kind of understanding that differs from ours in precisely the property that is to be explicated (and of course only in this one respect). From the differences in the way such an understanding would explain the given objects of experience, Kant can better determine what the peculiarity of our understanding consists in and at the same time show that this peculiarity need not be constitutive for nature. Imagine, for instance, an understanding, that does not need to judge mechanistically, i.e. an understanding that does not reduce a whole to the properties of its parts, but is in all other respects similar to ours. This different kind of understanding, if it wanted to find the conditions (causes, grounds) of a given object, would not search for the parts of the thing and then compound them in thought; it would not dissect the whole at all, but rather it would seek the (larger) whole of which the thing investi- 25 Driesch ("Kant und das Ganze," p. 369) asserts that Kant has fallen into an "obvious confusion of the relations universal-particular and whole-part." On the contrary, it is essential to note that Kant does not put the whole, but rather the part, in the place of the universal.
Mechanistic Explanation 165 gated is itself a part. For such a specifically different understanding, the subsumption of a particular under a universal would be equated with tracing back a part to its whole. The explanans would be the whole the explanandum the part — just the reverse of our way of thinking. Even though our understanding explains a system by examining its parts and ideally rebuilding the whole in thought, we can imagine a different understanding that explains a part of a system by examining the whole and then ideally detaching and isolating the part in thought. Kant does not maintain that we can really imagine such a process (in fact he denies it), he merely asserts that we can imagine an understanding that could envision such a process and that such an understanding does not involve any contradiction. Kant calls our understanding "discursive," and its point of departure (the explanans, namely the parts) for the causal explanation of a phenomenon he calls the "analytical universal" since the general grounds or causes of the phenomenon are found by dissection (analysis). The general explanatory principle is the part. For the other, imaginary kind of understanding, the point of departure (explanans) for the explanation of a phenomenon is the whole, which would be a "synthetic universal." Alluding to our intuition of space, where a space as a whole is intuited and a subspace is conditioned by the space surrounding it, Kant calls this contrast understanding "intuitive." This other understanding would sense no underdetermination (contingency) of the structure in relation to its component parts, e.g. in the form of an organic body, as our understanding does (cf. §61, B368ff; CJ, 236) It would not think that "nature could have built differently in a thousand ways," but would rather only ascertain that the various parts were the necessary consequences of the only natural division of such a whole. Kant begins his analysis of our mechanistic (analytical, discursive) peculiarity as follows: The point is this: Our understanding has the peculiarity that when it cognizes, e.g., the cause of a product, it must proceed from the analytically universal to the particular (i.e., from concepts to the empirical intuition that is given); consequently, in this process our understanding determines nothing regarding the diversity of the particular. Instead (under the sup position that the object is a natural product) our understanding must wait until the subsumption of the empirical intuition under the concept provides this determination for the power of judgment. But we can also conceive of an understanding that, unlike ours, is not discursive but intuitive, and hence proceeds from the synthetically universal (the intuition of a whole as
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KANT’S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN B
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Contents Acknowledgments...........
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Acknowledgements vii This book pres
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To My Parents M.M.M. and P.O.M.
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2 Introduction fact the rejection o
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4 Introduction almost exclusively c
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6 Introduction reductionism as the
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8 Theory of the Organism will be se
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10 Theory of the Organism when he f
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12 Theory of the Organism that this
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14 Theory of the Organism not in an
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16 Theory of the Organism formation
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18 Theory of the Organism common sp
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20 Theory of the Organism cated to
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22 Theory of the Organism by these
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24 Kant's Reading of Biology of the
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26 Kant's Reading of Biology for in
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28 Kant's Reading of Biology monly
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30 Kant's Reading of Biology not be
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32 Kant's Reading of Biology to ada
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34 Analytic of Teleological Judgmen
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54 Antinomies of Reason tent is par
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56 Antinomies of Reason antinomies
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58 Antinomies of Reason shows that
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60 Antinomies of Reason categories
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62 Antinomies of Reason "only condi
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64 Antinomies of Reason described;
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66 Kant's Logic For the true opposi
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68 Kant's Logic outside the sphere
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70 Kant's Logic In contrast to Lamb
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72 Kant's Logic predicate under con
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74 Kant's Logic other. We can thus
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76 Kant's Logic then both conflicti
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78 Kant's Logic Both conflicting pr
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80 The Unconditioned and the Infini
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98 Antinomy of Division Antithesis
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100 Antinomy of Division justificat
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102 Antinomy of Division and thus p
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104 Antinomy of Division why it is
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106 Antinomy of Division B552-53) g
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108 Antinomy of Division "machine"
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110 Antinomy of Freedom How far the
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112 Antinomy of Freedom of momentum
Page 124 and 125: 114 Antinomy of Freedom the Third a
Page 126 and 127: 116 Antinomy of Freedom If Kant mea
Page 128 and 129: 118 Antinomy of Freedom phenomena i
Page 130 and 131: 120 Antinomy of Freedom In the Crit
Page 132 and 133: 122 Antinomy of Freedom must appear
Page 134 and 135: 124 Systematics of Antinomy I do no
Page 136 and 137: 126 Summary position proves to be n
Page 138 and 139: 128 Antinomy of Judgment An antinom
Page 140 and 141: 130 Antinomy of Judgment §74 The r
Page 142 and 143: 132 Antinomy of Judgment must have
Page 144 and 145: 134 Antinomy of Judgment dialectic.
Page 146 and 147: 136 Antinomy of Judgment we cannot
Page 148 and 149: 138 Interpretations of the Antinomy
Page 162 and 163: 152 Heuristic but Necessary Princip
Page 172 and 173: 162 Resolution of the Antinomy the
Page 176 and 177: 166 Resolution of the Antinomy a wh
Page 178 and 179: 168 Resolution of the Antinomy able
Page 180 and 181: 170 Resolution of the Antinomy ous
Page 182 and 183: 172 Resolution of the Antinomy intr
Page 184 and 185: 174 Resolution of the Antinomy tion
Page 186 and 187: 176 Resolution of the Antinomy meth
Page 188 and 189: 178 Resolution of the Antinomy anyt
Page 190: 180 Summary acquainted with" a caus
Page 194 and 195: 184 Bibliography Bommersheim, Paul,
Page 196 and 197: 186 Bibliography Fraisse, Jean Clau
Page 198 and 199: 188 Bibliography Kraemer, Eric Russ
Page 200 and 201: 190 Bibliography & E. Mendelsohn) B
Page 202 and 203: 192 Bibliography Roretz, Karl, "Zur
Page 204 and 205: 194 Bibliography American and Conti
Page 206 and 207: 196 Index 144; 154; 167; 169; final
Page 208 and 209: 198 Index mere understanding 47; 13
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KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

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