Hurricanes: Their Nature and Impacts on Society - Climate Science ...

174 HURRICANES: THEIR NATURE AND IMPACT ON SOCffiTY
were just oblivious to things, as if they thought we never were going to have a
hurricane in this area" (quoted in Leen et a1. 1992).
Complacency was pervasive, <strong>and</strong> included home buyers as well as home
builders. As an engineering professor at the University of Miami noted:
"inspection is the second line of defense in this industry, you may want to
blame it all you want, but it's supposed to be built right in the first place"
(quoted in Leen et at. 1992). The failure in the Dade County building code
process is attributable to complacency throughout the system -including the
public, their elected representatives, appointed officials, <strong>and</strong> private industry.
Accountability Complacency persisted due to a lack of accountability. In
addition to building inspectors, the builders, government officials, <strong>and</strong> home
buyers also share responsibility for failing to ensure that building codes were
properly implemented. The magnitude of Andrew's destruction should not
come as a surprise to anyone in the south Florida community. Gr<strong>and</strong> jury
investigations called in 1976, 1986, <strong>and</strong> 1990 to assess the state of building
code implementation, revealed many flaws in the process. The 1976 gr<strong>and</strong> jury
suggested that "inspection practices of the last several years have resulted in
construction of buildings which could be blown away in another '1926
Hurricane.' ...We are concerned about such a situation" (Miami Herald
Staff 1992a). A 1990 gr<strong>and</strong> jury found that "our investigation into
construction problems <strong>and</strong> building inspections indicates that stricter controls
are needed to assure the continued integrity of construction" (Miami Herald
Staff 1992a). In addition, the following conclusions were drawn in the
aftermath of the 1926 Miami hurricane:
Well-built structures weathered the hurricane except for minor damage such as
broken windows <strong>and</strong> displaced roofing <strong>and</strong> shingles, while those of subst<strong>and</strong>ard
construction were generally wrecked. ...The older frame houses generally
withstood the storm, but many of the small frame buildings, erected during the
boom period, with little regard for proper bracing, were blown to bits early in
the storm. (Quoted in Cochran <strong>and</strong> Levitan 1994)
Communication One important part of the challenge of securing accountability
<strong>and</strong> thus effectively implementing building codes arises from a lack of
communication between different groups in the decision process. For instance,
in 1992 the federal building code for mobile homes, which prohibits state or
local officials from establishing their own st<strong>and</strong>ards, did not mention wind
speeds, <strong>and</strong> instead set its st<strong>and</strong>ards on a structure's ability to withst<strong>and</strong>
pressure. As a consequence of a lack of agreement on how to measure a
structure's ability to withst<strong>and</strong> pressure, "the mobile home industry <strong>and</strong> critics
differ on how to translate pressure into wind speeds" (Whoriskey 1992).
Federal, state, <strong>and</strong> industry officials had long argued that the federal code
translated to protection against 110 mph winds. A 1989 Texas Tech study
found the code only protects to 80 mph. A NIST study of the damage related
to Hurricane Andrew supported the findings of the 1989 study (Whoriskey