Hurricanes: Their Nature and Impacts on Society - Climate Science ...

58 HURRICANES: THEIR NATURE AND IMPACT ON SOCIETY
Coch 1994), yet had the evacuees at Lincoln High been less fortunate such
judgments would likely have been very different. The incident demonstrates
the fine line between success <strong>and</strong> failure in long-term planning for short-term
response in order to reduce vulnerability to hurricanes.
Another example is from Louisiana during Hurricane Andrew, when a
number of emergency management officials had difficulty interpreting updated
storm surge maps, <strong>and</strong> consequently relied on older, potentially dated information
(USACE/FEMA 1993). Other officials in Louisiana did not have
relevant software available to aid in the evacuation decision process (USACE/
FEMA 1993).
The protection of property at risk also has short-term <strong>and</strong> long-term components.
Designing structures to withst<strong>and</strong> hurricane-force winds is an
important factor in reducing property damage (e.g. Mehta, Cheshir <strong>and</strong>
McDonald 1992). An essential aspect in the reduction of property damage is
the establishment <strong>and</strong> enforcement of building codes commensurate with
expected hurricane incidence. A 1989 study found that building code enforcement
was a primary factor in reducing structural damage to buildings
(Mulady 1994). One insurance official claimed that poor compliance with
building codes accounted for about 25%, or about $4 billion, of the insured
losses in south Florida due to Hurricane Andrew (Noonan 1993). Other
estimates range upwards to 40%, or close to $6.5 billion.
Complacency is the enemy of preparedness. The New York Times reported
in 1993 that "of 34 coastal areas identified as needing evacuation studies, less
than half have been completed, <strong>and</strong> only $900,000 a year is available for
commissioning new ones" (Applebome 1993). A FEMA official complained
that the lack of "funding is inhibiting an aggressive <strong>and</strong> comprehensive
approach to hurricane preparedness programming" (Applebome 1993).
According to data provided by the Army Corps of Engineers in 1996, the
situation remains much the same, with many incomplete <strong>and</strong> dated studies (R.
Plott 1996, personal communication).
Complacency led to Dade County's lack of preparedness for Hurricane
Andrew (Leen et al. 1992). For instance, in 1988 Dade county employed 16
building inspectors to serve a population of well over one million. On many
occasions in the years preceding Andrew, inspectors reported conducting more
than 70 inspections per day, a rate of one every six minutes, not counting
driving time (Getter 1993). Such anecdotes highlight the need for systematic
assessments of hurricane preparedness in the broader context of hurricane
vulnerability before a hurricane strikes. There is sufficient evidence of complacency
along the US Atlantic <strong>and</strong> Gulf coasts that future hurricane disasters
should not come as surprises when they occur (cf. Sheets 1992; 1993; 1994;
1995).
With population-at-risk <strong>and</strong> property-at-risk in coastal areas rising rapidly,
<strong>and</strong> the rate of growth increasing as well, the key to reduced hurricane
exposure lies in improved preparedness. While past responses to reduce the