Hurricanes: Their Nature and Impacts on Society - Climate Science ...

HURRICANE ANDREW: FORECAST, IMPACT, RESPONSE
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industry cannot absorb the [Andrew] loss <strong>and</strong> the cash hit without increasing
rates" (quoted in Garcia <strong>and</strong> Satterfield 1992). The public <strong>and</strong> media
responded to the leaked memo angrily. Reaction to the memo reflects
fundamental difficulties in insuring property in areas subject to risk: Among
whom should the risk be spread? For instance, should people in Kansas pay
insurance premiums that reflect the costs of rebuilding oceanfront homes?
Should insurance rates for coastal residents be scaled to the expected annual
losses due to hurricanes? If so, rates would likely be higher then they have
been in the past. Should people be allowed to live in vulnerable areas without
insurance? These are difficult questions that have no simple answers, but
require attention in the process of improving society's hurricane preparedness.
7.4.1 Recovery
7.4 RESPONSE
A test of federal, state, <strong>and</strong> local emergency management
Hurricane Andrew was the fust time that the federal government's "Federal
Response Plan" had been used since it had been extensively modified
following Hurricane Hugo (1989). Beginning with Dade County Emergency
Manager Kate Hale's cry for help, broadcast in giant type on the front page
of The Miami Herald several days after impact (Chapter 1), the federal
government's initial response to Andrew was widely criticized. A General
Accounting Office evaluation of the implementation of the Federal Response
Plan following Hurricane Andrew's impact found a number of flaws.
The plan lacks, among other things, provisions for a comprehensive assessment
of damages <strong>and</strong> the corresponding needs of disaster victims. In addition, the
response in South Florida suffered from miscommunication <strong>and</strong> confusion of
roles <strong>and</strong> responsibilities at all levels of government -which slowed the delivery
of services to disaster victims. (GAD 1993a)
The official assessments of the federal response were aptly summarized by a
frustrated Dade County official who characterized the federal response as "a
whole lot of resources but no coordination" (Viglucci 1992).
One lesson in the aftermath of Andrew was a need for better communication
<strong>and</strong> coordination between meteorologists <strong>and</strong> agencies responsible for
federal disaster response, particularly FEMA. Thirty hours elapsed between
the issuance of a hurricane warning for south Florida <strong>and</strong> the declaration by
President Bush of a major disaster, nine hours after Andrew made l<strong>and</strong>fall
(FEMA 1993). While response activities did begin before the formal disaster
declaration, better communication <strong>and</strong> coordination between the forecasters
<strong>and</strong> emergency management officials may have facilitated recovery efforts in
the immediate aftermath of the event. A number of assessments of the Andrew