Hurricanes: Their Nature and Impacts on Society - Climate Science ...

TROPICAL CYCLONE FUNDAMENTALS 189
(e.g. through enforcement budget, frequency <strong>and</strong> quality of inspections) rather
than simply through the words of the code (BTFFDR 1995). In this manner a
more accurate assessment is possible of the health of this particular
preparedness process.
8. Short-term decisions are based upon decision processes developed over the
long term
When a hurricane approaches a particular stretch of coastline, effective
decision-making depends upon the existence of plans, procedure, <strong>and</strong> prior
preparation for the event. In the few hours before a storm strikes, only so
much can be done; thus time <strong>and</strong> efficiency are critical. Lacking effective longterm
preparation, a community may well be more vulnerable to a storm's
impact. Consider that up to $6 billion of Andrew's total damages were
attributed to failure to comply with existing building codes (Noonan 1993). In
addition, the successful evacuation of 750 000 residents out of the path of
Andrew is largely attributable to the existence of an updated evacuation plan.
As obvious as these points seem with hindsight, it is often the case that prior
planning for extreme events is overlooked or forgotten as it is not part of
"normal" decision routines. Most locations along the US Atlantic <strong>and</strong> Gulf
coasts have not experienced a direct strike from a hurricane in recent memory.
Appendix E reprints a guide, put together by officials in Lee County, Florida,
to 176 short-term decisions that must be made by a county emergency
management office. The guide is instructive because each of the 176 decisions
is in some way related to a decision process developed over the long term.
Such a "map" of decision for any particular decision-maker is a critical
element in evaluating preparedness.
9. Better knowledge of hurricanes, by itselj; is generally not sufficient for
behavior change
Those who study public response to natural disasters are well versed in the
persistence of the fallacy that better information is sufficient to lead to
improved decisions. As Sims <strong>and</strong> Baumann (1983) note in the context of
public response to natural disaster: "it doesn't necessarily follow that because
information is given it is received or because education is provided there is
learning". Knowledge does not always lead to action, but only "under highly
specified conditions, <strong>and</strong> if properly executed, with certain target publics,
information may lead to awareness <strong>and</strong> awareness may lead to behavior"
(ibid, emphasis in original). The same phenomenon of knowledge not leading
to action seems to occur not only with regard to public response to natural
disasters but with policymakers as well. .
Social scientists have explored many of the reasons why "policy happens"
<strong>and</strong> have developed a robust literature (e.g. Olson <strong>and</strong> Nilson 1982). From