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Sealing the Strait: An Analysis of Iran and the
Gulf Cooperation Council in the Strait of Hormuz
Ms Shannon Alexander
The Strait of Hormuz is a relatively unremarkable geographic feature, and to those
unfamiliar with its commercial and strategic significance, is little more than a channel
of water linking the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean. Yet this narrow strait is in fact
much more than simply a connecting body of water. Indeed, it is a potential site for
hostile military confrontation.
Nearly 40 per cent of all global energy supplies traverse the strait to various
destinations, rendering the safety of both exports and imports vital to the stability of
the global economy. Iran, lying to the north, is acutely aware of the power it yields in the
strait. It has certainly made no secret of its readiness to seal the channel, particularly
if a United States (US) or Israeli military attack on its nuclear facilities (suspected
nuclear weapons enrichment sites) was to occur. It is uncertain what policy objective
would be fulfilled by this action, given the harm Iran would incur on its own economy,
and the high risk of political isolation associated with any disruption of energy exports.
Nevertheless, Iran has invoked the threat of blocking the strait as its only real tool of
deterrence against the feared political and ideological ambitions of the West. 1
If Iran were to carry out this threat, the US has made it clear it would respond with
military force. The question then remaining is how the Gulf Arab states would react;
a matter riddled with conflicting considerations and far from simple to answer. It is
also complicated by the reality that both Iran and the US would hope to entice the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to back their operations through a campaign of
intimidation. The fact is, the GCC is not a coherent strategic body: the member states
lack common capacities, attitudes, and inclinations towards a military conflict with
Iran. This has proven particularly true in situations short of an all out war in the region.
However, as a sub-regional body the GCC would face a number of possible options,
including allying with the US against Iran, remaining publicly neutral in an effort to
preserve relations with both sides, or stepping out as an individual military bloc in
defence of mutual GCC interests. If Iran were to partially close the strait, it is possible
that the Gulf States would opt to privately support an international effort whilst
projecting a stance of impartiality. Although the GCC members are more readily allied
with Washington than with Tehran, they would not want to antagonise Iran as they
must live with it as a regional neighbour. And though they are suspicious of Iranian
hegemonic ambition, the GCC is deeply aware of Iran’s significance as a strategic