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96 australian maritime issues 2009: spc-a annual<br />

Saudi Arabia<br />

Assessing the reaction of Saudi Arabia to an Iranian challenge is complicated by<br />

conflicting considerations. The US withdrew from its Saudi Arabian bases in 2003,<br />

and the government would be hesitant to welcome an overwhelming US military<br />

presence in the region. Though they remain allies (Saudi recently refused offers of<br />

intercontinental ballistic missiles from China so as not to strain the US relationship),<br />

the Saudi government is wary of appearing too supportive of US operations in the<br />

region lest this aggravate an already restive population. 87 As such, the regime might<br />

be more supportive of UN involvement rather than a US-controlled intervention.<br />

In addition, Saudi Arabia sees Iran as a long-term threat because of its traditional<br />

territorial and power ambitions. Leaders view the threat of Iran’s nuclear program and<br />

leverage in the Strait of Hormuz as challenges that must be ‘managed’, in contrast to<br />

typical US policy to ‘solve’ the Iranian problem as fast as possible. Put simply, Saudi<br />

does not want the US to intervene with a short-term response bringing long-term<br />

consequences. For this reason, the government might encourage external powers to<br />

commit to managing the Iranian threat in both war and peace time contexts.<br />

However, Saudi Arabia and Iran have long struggled against each other for the<br />

role of regional hegemon, and it would be expected to encourage the repression of<br />

Iranian power objectives. Accordingly, in the scenario of a conflict in the strait, Saudi<br />

would likely support a strategy that would overwhelm Iran as fast as possible. 88 At<br />

the November 2007 GCC meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Vice-Minister of Defence Prince<br />

Abdulrahman bin Abdul Aziz declared: ‘because of the threats we face, we have to work<br />

hard to develop our armed forces to make them capable of providing regional stability<br />

and safety for energy resources’. 89 This demonstrated the government’s willingness<br />

to develop indigenous and regional forces to build a viable defence structure in the<br />

Gulf, which if credible could constitute a significant challenge and even deterrent<br />

to Iranian aggression. The US is supporting Riyadh’s plan to expand a Saudi force<br />

that protects ports, oil facilities, and water-desalinisation plants in the kingdom from<br />

10,000 to 35,000 men. 90<br />

Kuwait<br />

Kuwait is particularly concerned with ensuring the Gulf States work together to deter<br />

Iranian aggression (justifiably so after the Iraqi invasion of 1990). In 2007, Washington<br />

promised a US$20 billion arms package to the Gulf States, interpreted by many as an<br />

attempt to reinforce Gulf Arab defence systems and discourage Iranian belligerency. 91<br />

In February 2010, Kuwaiti Member of Parliament Ma’suma Al Mubarak defended the<br />

right of the Gulf States to build up their military capabilities, notably Patriot missile<br />

systems. She stated that ‘in light of US and Israeli threats against Iran, the Gulf States<br />

must develop their own security systems, so as not to become caught in the vise [created

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