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Is the Australian Defence Force too
Stove-Piped to Effectively Undertake
Expeditionary Operations?
Major Damien McLachlan
Our expansive strategic geography requires an expeditionary
orientation on the part of the ADF at the operational level, underpinned
by requisite force projection capabilities.
Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 1
The recent purchase of four C-17’s and upgrades to the C-130 fleet combined with
the impending introduction into service of two new Canberra class amphibious ships
(LHD) will give the Australian Defence Force (ADF) unprecedented force projection
capabilities. 2 The question now is whether the ADF has the required expeditionary
orientation to make maximum use of these capabilities. Many would argue that the
recent operational success of the ADF, particularly in East Timor in 1999 and 2006, and
current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, demonstrate that the ADF is expeditionary.
Being expeditionary, however, is not the same as having an expeditionary orientation
and others would comment that the ADF has been extremely lucky in these
deployments, with the exception of deployments to East Timor; the ADF has not
deployed joint forces. 3 An analysis of recent expeditionary operations conducted by
Western nations: the United Kingdom in the 1982 Falklands war, Operation PALLISER
in Sierra Leone 2000, and the United States led 1990-91 Gulf War and 2003 Iraq War;
demonstrate that joint forces are essential for successful expeditionary operations. 4
Operation ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo 1999, on the other hand, demonstrated that an
operation conducted without expeditionary ground forces took substantially greater
time and resources to achieve a quasi-successful result. 5 Therefore, this essay will first
examine the joint interoperability of the ADF and show that this joint approach is only
skin-deep. The second section will look at the stove-pipes in the ADF; in particular
focusing on the influence and control each of the Services has and how this is inhibiting
the move towards a joint organisation. The last section will determine if the ADF has an
expeditionary orientation and why this orientation is essential. In conclusion, this paper
will demonstrate that the ADF has the facade of a joint approach, yet with the pending
introduction into service of the LHDs, the ADF is unprepared for the expeditionary
orientation required to maximise this capability.