Download - Royal Australian Navy

126 australian maritime issues 2009: spc-a annual
The US approach to expeditionary operations is based upon task forces (consisting of US
Navy and US Marine Corps elements) capable of attaining sea control and undertaking
maritime power projection. 30 Sea control forces include elements providing a protective
bubble around the expeditionary units, using their anti-air warfare, anti-submarine
warfare, anti-surface warfare and mine countermeasure capabilities to safeguard
their marine team-members while at sea. In addition sea control forces provide strike
capabilities (air, missile and naval surface fire) in support of expeditionary units
ashore. The US uses a combined Navy and Marine Corps task force which typically
consists of two components: a Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
(MEU(SOC)), and an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG).
The ADF moved part of the way towards the US model when it adopted the ARG model
for its amphibious doctrine. 31 Today the ADF typically operates its Kanimbla class
amphibious ships and heavy landing ship as constituents of an ARG, with the Australian
Army providing units for small craft operations as well as to control embarkation and
disembarkation - known as a Ship’s Army Detachment (SAD). However the SAD falls
far short of the Australian Army strategic requirement for expeditionary operations.
Examination of the following organisational diagrams shows that the Australian
Army does not have any comparable organisation to the MEU(SOC), neither is the
Army component within the ARG anything like that required for strategically flexible
operations that are routinely undertaken by a maritime expeditionary force. Much work
also has to be done by the Australian Navy to meet the equivalent ARG requirements.
Despite many Australian historical examples and the modern US experience, the
value to be gained from a forward deployed Australian maritime expeditionary force
in coalition with our allies, using poise and presence to deter potential enemies and
influence events ashore, has yet to be recognised, let alone understood, by many
strategists within Australia.
Figures 1 and 2 show, comparison purposes, formations of a typical United States
MEU(SOC) and ARG.
One of the reasons that maritime strategy and expeditionary warfare is not well
understood within the ADF is due to the disproportionate effort attached to the tactical
level of command at the expense of operational and strategic command. Although this
is a relatively common problem within the ADF as a whole, some within Army have
yet to grasp the strategic realities of Australia’s role as a medium power in a part of
the world that is dominated by the maritime environment. The ADF needs to use the
sea to its advantage; it needs to overcome potential crises before they degenerate into
war. The US Marine Corps expeditionary concepts are useful constructs for the ADF,
although they will need to be modified to better reflect the way the nation wishes to
project power abroad, noting that Australia is a medium power not a super power. That
does not detract from the usefulness of the US concepts as they stand today.