Download - Royal Australian Navy

Sealing the STRAIT
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Freighters also deliver civilian commodities and armaments to Iran, Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait. 9 In August 2006 Bahrain became the first GCC
state to establish a Free Trade Agreement with the US, and in 2009 imported US$463.5
million worth of goods including foodstuffs, industrial equipment, automobiles, and
military apparatus. 10 Iran imports foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals from the US, as
well as refined petroleum it cannot produce (approximately 130,000 barrels per day
(b/d)). 11 Indeed, whilst the world’s attention is often focused on the level of exports
from the region, for the GCC and Iran the safe passage of imports is just as critical as
the protection of their exports.
Rules of transit
All transit through the strait occurs under the provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (LOSC), in which section 2 details the rights and
duties of transiting vessels. 12 The passage of commercial traffic is coordinated through
a Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) recognised by the United Nations (UN) International
Maritime Organization. The TSS is designed to reduce the risk of maritime traffic
accidents and is included on nautical charts. 13 It consists of two 40km long shipping
corridors, each 3.2km wide and separated by another 3.2km wide buffer. Located within
its territorial waters, Oman is officially responsible for the protection of shipping along
these sea lanes. 14 However, transit through the strait is not restricted to the TSS, and
the depth of the water is great enough for large tankers to pass through closer to the
Iranian coast. An 80km long separation scheme is located further within the Persian
Gulf, regulated by Iran from the islands of Greater Tunb and Forur. 15
Islands within the strait
In 1978, an officer of the Supreme Commander’s staff under the Shah of Iran noted
the strategic importance of a cluster of islands located within the western approach to
the strait. 16 Iran continues to have a fierce tactical interest in controlling these islands,
four of which are particularly suitable for influencing the shipping lanes: Abu Musa,
Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Forur. 17 During the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, Iran used
Abu Musa as a base to attack ships belonging to Iraq’s trading partners or countries
financially backing the Iraqi war effort. 18 The anti-shipping campaigns of Iran and
Iraq were labelled the ‘Tanker War’ (1984-88); a conflict often analysed as a model
in the event of a future conflict in the strait. 19 Abu Musa is also a valuable resource,
containing half a billion barrels of oil and rich in gas and red iron dioxide. 20 Greater
and Lesser Tunb are considered to be strategically located in the perceived line of
defence of the strait. Abu Musa and the Tunbs have been dominated (and fortified) by
Iran since 1971, despite years of territorial contestation with the UAE. 21 Formally, the
UAE has co-sovereignty over the islands, and tension regarding their status continues
to strain bilateral relations. 22