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is the adf too stove-piped to effectively undertake expeditionary operations?
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In accordance with current direction by the Chief of the Defence Force, each of the
Service Chiefs is responsible for the RTS functions of their Service. The JOC Operational
Preparedness Requirement (OPR) provides guidance to the Services as to the required
quantity and skill level of forces; however, as the JOC OPR serials are not linked to
resources, Service Chiefs have some flexibility in training requirements. 19 In this
respect, the Service Chiefs decide what skills, tasks, and roles personnel from their
Service will perform. The effect of this is that there is no incentive to conduct joint
training or maintain joint skills. Service Chiefs are therefore able to focus on ‘The War’
and not ‘A War’ as required by the JOC OPR.
When examining the current forces elements deployed, the majority are single Service
based. In Afghanistan the Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force, Special Operations
Task Group and Rotary Wing Group are all majority Army units. Most naval fleet assets
deploy without personnel from other Services and AP‐3Cs and the Control and Reporting
Centre when deployed to Afghanistan are essentially Air Force only units. Only HQ
Hoint Task Force (JTF) 633, the Force Support Unit and Force Communications Unit are
joint organisations. What makes this situation more obviously stove-pipe deployments
is that these units, with the exception of the joint units, are assigned to separate
NATO commands and do not generally support each other. Although HQ JTF633 is the
National Command Element for all of these units, it has no tactical responsibility and
provides only administration and reporting functions. This single Service deployment
environment encourages the Services to continue with their single Service mentality
and does not facilitate joint interoperability.
There are a number of key drivers that show if a force has a joint orientation, including
doctrine, equipment procurement process and personnel management. An examination
of the doctrine process shows that the ADF has a disparate structure. Ideally, doctrine
is designed top down; that is the capstone concepts are developed, followed by the
generalised concepts then the specific concepts and finally the training, techniques
and procedures. Yet an examination of the ADF doctrine process shows that the three
Services develop doctrine independently. As mentioned earlier, the ADF doctrine
organisation, ADFWC is now non-existent and its replacement, JWDTC ineffectively
manned and tasked to control this process; the result is that the Services control
doctrine and joint interoperability is not the guiding principle. So if this is the case
for doctrine what about the other elements?
In the resource constrained environment that the ADF currently finds itself in, the
three Services are competing against each other for finite resources to maintain current
equipment and purchase new equipment. There are two possible solutions, compromise
with the other Services and agree to reducing one’s own capability, or ‘fight the fight’ and
risk being told what to lose. 20 A look at 2009 Defence White Paper and current equipment
acquisition projects demonstrates that fights had been fought and won. 21 Although there
have been some minor compromises and loses, and the fact that the majority of major