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the weaknesses of expeditionary operations when compared with continental defence
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outlook in regional affairs and defence policy. Accordingly, during the 1970s and 1980s
‘Australia pursued a number of multilateral policy initiatives in Asia, and cultivated
stronger bilateral ties with regional actors such as China and Indonesia’. 8
At this time, Australian defence policy again shifted to continental defence, focusing
solely on the defence of Australian territory and its immediate maritime surrounds.
The concept of continental defence and self-reliance was most clearly articulated in
the Hawke government’s 1987 White Paper. 9 The Defence of Australia 1987 stated that
Australia’s fundamental security interest lay in the promotion of regional stability.
Self reliance indicated that Australia’s defence policy ‘must be set firmly within
the framework of [Australian] alliances and regional associations’. 10 In fact, former
Minister for Foreign Affiars Gareth Evans believed that Australian foreign policy had
historically languished under a ‘restrictive dependency: that its first task was to attract
the attention of great and powerful friends’. 11 In articulating the Defence of Australia
concept, former Minister for Defence Kim Beazley explained that Australian military
capability developed for the defence of Australia additionally provided an ability to
promote regional security. 12
Yet, during the 1990s, Australia’s defence policy again shifted offshore. Australia’s
involvement in the 1999 East Timor crisis, and its immediate commitment of combat
forces to Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the 2003 invasion of
Iraq have resulted in a massive increase of overseas deployments for the Australian
Defence Force that are likely to continue into the foreseeable future. 13 Nevertheless,
such force projection has traditionally been physically and fiscally costly to Australia,
and highlights inherent weaknesses in expeditionary campaigns at all levels of
operations. A review of the results of the last 100 years simply underscores this point.
Historically, 60,000 Australian deaths on expeditionary operations during WWI though
rightly enshrined by Charles Bean as establishing the Australian identity, provided
no guarantee to Australia 25 years later when Britain could not assure the defence of
Australia against a militant Japan. WWII and Australia’s expeditionary deployments
into the South-West Pacific during this conflict ensured the nation’s survival, and are
perhaps the only time in which an Australian force projection has been successful in
securing national interests.
Since this time the return for Australia’s commitment of expeditionary forces overseas
has been poor. Moreover, it is questionable as to whether any overseas Australian
military expedition since has achieved success. In 1950, Australia immediately
despatched an expeditionary force on the outbreak of the Korean War, and in 1951,
Australia, New Zealand and the US signed the ANZUS security treaty. 14 ANZUS
provided security for Australia under the mantle of protection from a larger power; this
is particularly due to perceptions of an emerging and expansionist communist China,
or the threat of a resurgent Japan. 15 While the ANZUS treaty signified a substantial
shift away from Australia’s traditional links with Britain, it equally indicated that the