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the enduring naval logistics lessons of world war II and korea<br />

63<br />

of Japan. The problem there was how to sustain the level of resupply to their carriers<br />

in order to cope with the huge increase in consumption of aviation fuel and ordnance<br />

caused by the high sortie rate of their jet aircraft. With such jets consuming fuel four<br />

times faster than piston-engined aircraft, and able to carry much heavier payloads,<br />

both fuel and ammunition expenditure rates were to skyrocket. Despite the respective<br />

sizes of US <strong>Navy</strong> forces between 1945 and the Korean War, in the first ten months of<br />

the Korean War the US naval and marine aircraft expended one fourth as much aircraft<br />

ammunition as that of all US marine and naval ships or shore based aircraft combined<br />

from all theatres in World War II. 4 The result was that replenishment at sea increased<br />

from every third day in a 21 day cycle in the early part of the war to, by the end of the<br />

war, every evolution taking anything up to nine hours despite additional rig stations,<br />

with nightly replenishment eventually becoming the rule. 5<br />

HMAS Sydney (III) and USS Hanna replenishing at sea off the Korean coast.<br />

By the end of the Korean War naval logistics could sustain carriers and their aircraft at<br />

a high tempo, for extended periods at a great distance from their support base (RAN)<br />

Mobile Logistic Support: The Doctrinal Legacy of World War II<br />

and Korea<br />

Progress post-World War II in refining logistics policy based on wartime experience was<br />

erratic, partly because in terms of naval priorities during a time of severe fiscal restraint,<br />

any improvements in underway replenishment capability were evolutionary in nature<br />

and peripheral in consequence. What was here to stay, though, was the concept of<br />

deploying fleet trains specifically for the purpose of sustaining at sea carrier strike<br />

task forces so that they could act as independently as possible from their permanent<br />

bases anywhere in the world, which would indeed soon become the central tenet of<br />

American naval doctrine going forward. Even for the Americans, however, who had

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