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90 australian maritime issues 2009: spc-a annual
In mine warfare, the sower has a psychological advantage: what is important is
the number and power of mines Iran publically ‘declares’ it has sown. Indeed, the
uncertainty of mine threat can be just as powerful as the certainty. This is because
tanker captains and shipping companies aren’t likely to risk damage to their vessels,
regardless of the perceived level of risk. (However, it should be noted that many tankers
did take this risk traversing the strait during the Iran-Iraq War. Indeed, the level of
damage that mines can inflict on a tanker is debatable). 55 It is also increasingly tricky
to detect and sweep modern naval mines: the US maintains four ships with mine
countermeasure capabilities in the Persian Gulf, yet limited resources are invested in
minesweeping equipment and improvement, meaning that innovations in mine design
are outpacing advancements in minesweeping operations. 56
The Global Impact
Blocking the strait to shipping or sabotaging oil installations in the Gulf would invite
international condemnation and almost certainly a military response from the US.
Stratfor concludes that in the interest of securing ‘freedom of the seas’, the US Navy
would be ‘forced to respond aggressively’. 57
Religious tension
In the event of conflict with the US, there is the real possibility that Iran would incite
rebellion amongst Shiite populations in neighbouring countries. 58 Iran might target the
Shiite Muslims in Iraq, Kuwait, Yemen, the oil-rich Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia,
and in Bahrain where Shiites form a 70 per cent majority. 59 If the Shiite population of
Bahrain were to rise up against the royal family, there would be major social upheaval
and civil unrest. Al Hamad believes that the security threat born out of the export of
Iran’s revolution was one reason why the GCC was formed: with a majority of GCC
citizens being Sunni Muslims, the Twelver Shiite revolutionary slogans and rhetoric
threatened to encourage and inflame religious tensions. 60
In late 2009, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki indirectly denounced
Saudi Arabia’s support of the Yemeni government’s fight against Shiite Houthi rebels
in northern Yemen. 61 His threat that ‘those who pour oil on the fire must know that
they will not be spared from the smoke that billows’ was viewed as a warning to
Sunni-led Saudi Arabia that Iran is not scared to support, and rally, Shiite followers
in regional, religious or ethnic conflict. 62 However, it should be noted that Iran’s
ability to stimulate unrest among Shiites in the Gulf is perhaps more limited than
its revolutionary rhetoric would suggest. 63