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102 australian maritime issues 2009: spc-a annual
concerning a resolution to impose new economic sanctions on Iran. China’s economic
survival is hinged on sufficient oil supply, and it would be inclined to act to secure
this supply. Thus the GCC might encourage China to pursue non-military means to
dissuade Iran from continued aggression.
An international convention or resolution
During a conflict in the strait, the GCC states might choose to draft a UN Security Council
Resolution for the security of maritime traffic. Historical maritime precedents include
the Iran-Iraq War, the 1990-91 Gulf War and the issue of piracy off the east coast of
Somalia. During the Iran-Iraq War, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 552 (1984),
condemning all attacks on neutral shipping. Between 1990-91, the UN Security Council
passed 17 resolutions regarding the situation in Iraq and Kuwait. 121 Resolution 661 imposed
economic sanctions on Iraqi imports and exports, including the shipment of commodities
and products via Iraqi-flagged vessels. 122 Resolution 678 authorised the use of ‘all necessary
means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (requiring the withdrawal of Iraq from
Kuwait) and to restore international peace and security in the area’. 123 This included the
deployment of international naval forces. In 2008, the UN Security Council passed four
resolutions regarding anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast. Resolution 1851 grants
member states the permission to use land, sea and air power to fight piracy and armed
robbery in Somali territory. In the strait, a resolution might include the condemnation of
targeted attacks on commercial shipping and the insistence of freedom of navigation. This
would provide greater legal justification for a military response.
In recognition of the danger Iran poses to security in the strait, the GCC might seek
the formulation of a convention to prevent a recurrence of maritime traffic disruption.
Sokolski suggests the creation of a convention requiring a demilitarisation of the strait
and a guarantee of free passage. Such a convention would appeal to Iran because it
would prevent foreign powers closing the strait to Iranian exports, and would require all
submarines to surface before entering or exiting. It would also require Iran to demilitarise
fortified islands within and adjacent to the strait, and would provide international legal
grounds for a military response were Iran to impede maritime traffic. 124
Conclusion
The GCC states acknowledge that defence self-sufficiency is beyond their reach in the
foreseeable future, and will therefore continue to rely on the assistance of external powers.
Compared to a decade ago, there is a higher level of personal interaction and respect
among the elite level of the GCC states. However, they remain cousins not brothers, and
as such continue to be ‘sensitive to slights, whether real or imagined’. 125 GCC leaders need
to be exposed to increased cooperation on all levels for genuine unity to be a possibility
through generational change. For the coming decade then, it is difficult to imagine the
consolidation of a consistent strategic doctrine on the GCC sub-regional level.