Download - Royal Australian Navy

Sealing the STRAIT
97
by] the US and Iran’. 92 She emphasised that the development of their defence systems
was a precautionary measure, not a provocation against Iran, and that the GCC did not
intend to allow their land to be used as a base to strike Iran. 93
Kuwait is also concerned with ensuring oil exports can continue for a reasonable period
should Iran close the strait. It has signed an agreement with the Republic of Korea
allowing it to stockpile crude oil in the Republic, and the head of state-run Kuwait
Petroleum Corp confirmed that Kuwait and other Gulf States have planned to develop
similar precautionary measures to safeguard their exports. 94 In 2008 Kuwait conducted
talks with Japan and Vietnam to construct refineries for Kuwaiti oil (scheduled to go
online by 2013), and has plans to invest in a joint refinery and petrochemical facility in
southern China. By encouraging these Asian states to invest in Kuwait’s oil production
capacity, Kuwait might be hoping to increase the level of condemnation directed at
Iran were it to block the straight to oil exports.
The United Arab Emirates
The UAE tends to view Iran’s influence in the Gulf in a negative light, and continues
to be on shaky terms with Iran regarding the status of the three islands: Abu Musa,
Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. Its military procurement program is arguably focused
on countering the perceived Iranian threat: in the past two years, the UAE has purchased
more than US$15 billion in US arms. 95 However, the emirate of Dubai and Iran have a
strong economic relationship which both would be concerned to preserve. Specifically,
Dubai and Iran trade around US$14-18 billion annually, and their trade relationship
has allowed Iran to circumvent international sanctions. 96 Theodore Karasik, research
director at INEGMA, has said there are procurement networks in Iran using suppliers
in the UAE to obtain US-manufactured military equipment. This is in direct violation
of a US embargo of such products to Iran. 97
Qatar
Qatar’s relatively amiable relations with Iran are well-noted, and criticised, by regional
actors. In recent years Qatar has been accused of financially and politically supporting
the Palestinian resistance group Hamas (also backed by Iran and Syria). In early 2009,
Egypt criticised Qatar’s ‘pro-Iranian’ stance as hypocritical given its defence ties with
the US. Indeed, Qatar’s ostensible ‘courtship’ of Iran has served to emphasise rifts
between the Gulf States and the broader Arab Middle East. It is accused of desiring
greater power in the Gulf by seeking greater ties with Iran.
However, Qatar is also aware that it is not guaranteed safety from Iran if conflict
erupts in the Gulf. In January 2010, Qatar agreed to an upgrade of US anti-missile
defence systems in the Gulf, along with Bahrain, the UAE, and Kuwait, demonstrating
its readiness to bolster Arab defences and deter Iranian hostility. 98 However, signed