Download - Royal Australian Navy

Adaptive Campaigning with a
Maritime Expeditionary Force
Dr Gregory P Gilbert
The more I consider the problem of defence the more I reach the
conclusion that the answer lies basically in the ability to use the sea and
air power freely, and so confine the enemy to a land strategy. Only in this
way will the maximum flexibility be possible … Armies must go to sea.
Montgomery of Alamein, 1968 1
Land forces are central and people (the human condition) are of overriding importance
in any strategy that aims to achieve decisive results in modern conflicts. The Australian
Army’s Adaptive Campaigning concept is premised on such conditions, however it
could be further developed. 2 There are many reasons why Adaptive Campaigning has
been limited to the joint land force construct, but the concept’s applicability should
and must be much wider, especially as Australia’s maritime strategy is the lynchpin
of Australia’s defence policy. 3 Montgomery is right: ‘armies must go to sea’ and
maritime forces need to come to the forefront of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). 4
This paper discusses how the Adaptive Campaigning concept can apply to a maritime
expeditionary force. 5 Much of this discussion is not new, various aspects continue to
be debated by specialists within the ADF and hence this paper aims to restate and
reconceptualise such thinking.
The 2009 Defence White Paper describes how Australia’s strategic outlook is changing,
and although it is not all doom and gloom, the future is characterised by uncertainties,
instabilities and potential disasters (man-made and natural). 6 On the other hand,
Australia’s strategic interests remain largely the same, being limited by our geography,
population, economy and politics. Actions in defence of Australia continue to include
important tasks such as: protecting our sovereignty at home, supporting legitimate
governments in the Indo-Pacific region and contributing to international order across
the globe. There would be few, if any, who would disagree with this broad narrative,
however it is the interpretation of the details of the strategic environment that leads
to differences of opinion as to which over-arching strategy is best for the ADF. Such
differences are largely a result of long periods when traditions and concepts were
developed in isolation by each of Australia’s armed services. Recently, one of the results
of this parallel development has been a discontinuity between joint land force concepts
- fighting small wars (such as counter-insurgencies or counter-terrorist actions) and
joint maritime force concepts - planning to fight high-end wars (such as a conventional
state v state war). 7 However, much of this discontinuity is in practice illusionary, as