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134 australian maritime issues 2009: spc-a annual
20
Although unstated, the Adaptive Campaigning spaghetti diagram and the ‘Five Lines of
Operation’ do not relate to conditions within Australia, our citizens or our coastal cities
and towns.
21
Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine LWD 3-0-0, Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral
Environment (MOLE), (Developing Doctrine), 2004.
22
Till, Seapower, pp. 249-50.
23
For background see D Stevens, Strength Through Diversity: The Combined Naval Role in
Operation Stabilise, Working Paper No. 20, Sea Power Centre - Australia, Canberra, 2007.
24
In the past Australians have conducted few important joint operations in the littorals, however
the most important being German New Guinea 1914, New Guinea 1945, Borneo 1945 and East
Timor 1999. See M Evans, The Role of the Australian Army in a Maritime Concept of Strategy,
Working Paper No. 101, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 1998; and M Evans, From
Legend to Learning: Gallipoli and the Military Revolution of World War I, Working Paper No.
110, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 2000.
25
For more detail see Till, Seapower, chapters 8 and 9, especially pp. 221-4.
26
Till, Seapower, p. 223.
27
The core US doctrinal documents continue to evolve. The 1992 ‘From the Sea’ and 1994
‘Forward … From the Sea’ concepts were followed by US Marine Corps, Marine Corps
Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 3: Expeditionary Operations, Quantico, 1998 and US Marine
Corps, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare: Marine Corps Capstone Concept, Quantico, 2001. Such
expeditionary concepts remain an essential component of the sea basing and global maritime
partnership constructs. US Navy, US Marine Corps and US Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy
for 21st Century Seapower, released in October 2007, confirms that the ‘expeditionary character
and versatility of maritime forces provide the US the asymmetric advantage of enlarging or
contracting its military footprint in areas where access is denied or limited. Permanent or
prolonged basing of our military forces overseas often has unintended economic, social or
political repercussions. The sea is a vast maneuver space, where the presence of maritime
forces can be adjusted as conditions dictate to enable flexible approaches to escalation, deescalation
and deterrence of conflicts’.
28
See for example Australian Defence Force, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP)
3.2, Amphibious Operations, Defence Publishing Service, Canberra, 2009.
29
See RE Schmidle, ‘Distributed Operations: from the Sea’, Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 88, no.
7, 2004, pp. 37-41, and subsequent papers in the Marine Corps Gazette. For the Australian
context see J Kelly & M Brennan, Distributed Manoeuvre: 21st Century Offensive Tactics, Working
Paper No. 134, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 2009.
30
Sea control is defined as ‘that condition which exists when one has freedom of action to use
an area of sea for one’s own purposes for a period of time and, if required, deny its use to an
adversary. The state includes the air space above, the water mass and seabed below as well
as the electro-magnetic spectrum. To an increasing degree, it also includes consideration of
space based assets’. Maritime power projection is defined as ‘power projection in and from
the maritime environment, including a broad spectrum of offensive military operations to
destroy enemy forces or logistic support or to prevent enemy forces from approaching within
enemy weapons’ range of friendly forces. Maritime power projection may be accomplished by
amphibious assault operations, attack of targets ashore, or support of sea control operations’
(Royal Australian Navy, Australian Maritime Doctrine, pp. 205 & 199).