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the weaknesses of expeditionary operations when compared with continental defence
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At an operational level, force projection in an expeditionary sense is compounded by
logistical and administrative challenges. The Air Power Manual defines an expeditionary
operation as ‘the projection of military power over extended lines of communication into
a distant operational area to accomplish a specific objective.’ 23 Australian maritime and
land doctrine espouse similar concepts. Accordingly, Australian forces must be capable
of being tailored to conducting decisive action over the complete spectrum of operations,
including: humanitarian, security, peace and stability and counter insurgency
operations. Planning for such operations in a coalition force, the environment in which
Australia is likely to continue to deploy, creates an inherent burden for the supply
chain of the Australian Defence Organisation. Quick access to infrastructure, rapid
deployment, rapid employment and immediate sustainment of deployed forces are
also the hallmarks of successful expeditionary operations. 24 However, contentious
issues like entry and exit points, customs, over flight authorisations, blanket diplomatic
clearances and facility access agreements create administrative overheads with the
potential to delay or affect force projection. 25 Such factors indicate the importance
of establishing agreement among multinational partners, including host nation
endorsement, during the conduct of expeditionary operations.
At the strategic level, Australia’s current expeditionary commitments are beset by
even greater difficulties. The problems facing near neighbours including East Timor,
the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea include weakness in the social, political
and governance fabric of the nations themselves. In order to foster regional stability
and cooperation, Australia faces the difficult prospect of institutional root and branch
reform in these countries with no template on how to do so. Such assistance goes
well beyond the traditional concept of providing developmental aid, and Australia’s
expeditionary engagement in such places during the last decade has led to a regional
perception of Australia acting as the US’s deputy sheriff in the Asia-Pacific. Australia’s
involvement in the 1999 East Timor emergency simply underscored this perception.
Although the US played no direct part in the intervention in East Timor, Australian
lobbying successfully resulted in America tacitly warning Indonesia that any
Indonesian military opposition to Australian forces in Timor would result in massive
economic ramifications. 26 When interviewed by The Bulletin magazine in 1999, Prime
Minister John Howard aggravated circumstances by concurring that Australia was
the US deputy sheriff when dealing with regional trouble spots. 27 The obtuse analogy
damaged Australia’s key relationships throughout Asia and Australia was condemned
for the patronising manner of its expeditionary practices. 28
To compound this, in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, Australia’s
alliance with the US resulted in further critical scrutiny from its closest neighbours.
In fact, ‘in some parts of the region at least, Canberra [was] viewed as the ally that
cannot say ‘’no’’’, and the goal of defeating potential threats offshore has seen a return
to policies akin to forward defence. 29 Today, there are ever increasing Australian
expeditionary commitments to the Middle East and Afghanistan. Professor Hugh White