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8 australian maritime issues 2009: spc-a annual
In other words, these wars also have changed in character. I’ve watched and advised
two administrations as they have dealt with this struggle. And I’ve come to three
conclusions – three principles – about the proper use of modern military forces. The
first is that military power should not, maybe cannot, be the last resort of the state.
Military forces are some of the most flexible and adaptable tools to policy makers. We
can, merely by our presence, help alter certain behavior. Before a shot is even fired, we
can bolster a diplomatic argument, support a friend or deter an enemy. We can assist
rapidly in disaster-relief efforts, as we did in the aftermath of Haiti’s earthquake. We
can help gather intelligence, support reconnaissance and provide security. And we can
do so on little or no notice. That ease of use is critical for deterrence; an expeditionary
force provides immediate, tangible effects. It is also vital when innocent lives are at
risk. So yes, the military may be the best and sometimes the first tool; it should never
be the only tool. The tangible effects of military engagement may give policy makers a
level of comfort not necessarily or wholly justified. As we have seen, the international
environment is more fluid and more complex than ever before. Not every intended
target of one’s deterrent will act rationally and not every good intention will be thus
received. Longer-lasting, more sustainable effects will most assuredly demand a wholeof-government,
if not a whole-of-nation effort. Defence and diplomacy are simply no
longer discrete choices, one to be applied when the other one fails, but must, in fact,
complement one another throughout the messy process of international relations. As
President Obama noted in his West Point speech, when he announced his strategy
for Afghanistan, we cannot count on military might alone. We have to invest in our
homeland security; we have to improve and better coordinate our intelligence; and
we will have to use diplomacy, because no one nation can meet the challenges of an
interconnected world acting alone. My fear, quite frankly, is that we aren’t moving
fast enough in this regard. US foreign policy is still too dominated by the military, too
dependent upon the generals and admirals who lead our major overseas commands.
It is one thing to be able and willing to serve as emergency responders; quite another
to always have to be the fire chief. Secretaries Clinton and Gates have called for
more funding and more emphasis on our soft power, and I could not agree with them
more. Should we choose to exert American influence solely through our troops, we
should expect to see that influence diminish in time. In fact, I would argue that in the
future struggles of the asymmetric counterinsurgent variety, we ought to make it a
precondition of committing our troops, that we will do so only if and when the other
instruments of national power are ready to engage as well.
There’s a broader issue involved here. For, in addition to bringing the full weight of
the US government to bear, we must also bring our allies and partners with us to the
fight. Forty-two other nations fight alongside us in Afghanistan, as did so many others
in Iraq. Whether by formal alliance or by informal agreement, these multinational
commitments lend not only a higher sense of legitimacy to the effort, they lend to local
populations certain skills and knowledge which we alone do not posses. The Australians