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100 australian maritime issues 2009: spc-a annual<br />

military response - on behalf of the world - in defence of the sea lanes.<br />

What follows is a two week military confrontation between Iran and<br />

the US (and allies).<br />

With naval and air bases in the Gulf, the US is able to respond fast and<br />

with vigour. The US intervention includes mine clearing operations<br />

in the strait and warfare against Iran. 106 (Military experts estimate<br />

that securing the strait would take at least one month). 107 As the<br />

conflict progresses and Iran feels the impact of superior US tactical<br />

and operational capabilities, it aims to heavily damage or sink a US<br />

warship, and attack US military installations such as the Fifth Fleet HQ<br />

in Bahrain. It is feared that Iran might also target water desalination<br />

plants along the southern shores of the Gulf, which provide over 60 per<br />

cent of the drinking water needed by the Arab Gulf States. 108<br />

In this critical scenario, the GCC would collectively aim to protect mutual commercial,<br />

territorial and political interests by uniting behind the US and its allies. 109 Historically,<br />

the Iran-GCC relationship has been one of significant mistrust regarding motive and<br />

intent. Iranian missile tests, the suspected nuclear weapons enrichment program, and<br />

support for Hamas, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad have all served to heighten unease<br />

among the GCC states. 110 As such, the GCC has generally desired to internationalise<br />

regional security to gain the commitment of a broad range of external actors (a sort of<br />

insurance policy for their survival). 111<br />

The smaller GCC states would also want to avoid a heavy reliance on Saudi Arabia, as<br />

this could give it reason to assume a more assertive role as the regional hegemon. The<br />

more progressive states such as the UAE and Qatar would be hesitant to give Saudi<br />

too much control within the GCC, lest it be inclined to impose its stricter religious and<br />

social ideals upon them.<br />

Internationalising the conflict<br />

The Gulf States are thoroughly conscious of their inability to oppose Iran as an independent<br />

alliance. Even collectively, the GCC simply cannot match the military power of Iran.<br />

Although the GCC aims to act in the interest of their collective security, it is not equipped to<br />

deploy a capable force with a coherent strategy. In the event of a strait closure, the response<br />

would need to be quick yet well-calculated, and it is doubtful the GCC could achieve this<br />

without external support. As such, the GCC would rely on the US (and possibly France) to<br />

deploy forces from their stations in the Gulf (Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE). 112<br />

In the Tanker War, the US re-flagged Kuwaiti tankers under its flag (upon request by<br />

Kuwait), signalling that an attack on these vessels would constitute an attack on the US.<br />

After a US warship almost fatally struck a mine, the US launched Operation PRAYING<br />

MANTIS, destroying two Iranian oil platforms and three warships, and neutralising

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