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key lessons from the 1982 falkland islands campaign
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geography was the primary limiting factor that affected both sides’ ability to achieve
air superiority. Geography is particularly relevant to Australia’s strategic regional
interests and important for the government and military planners to remember that
‘crises do not always occur within the range of a friendly air base’. 30
If Australia was to conduct an expeditionary operation of the same or similar magnitude
it would most likely experience the type of air power limitations that the Argentineans
endured during the Falklands War. Even though many of the Royal Australian Air Force’s
current force structure deficiencies should be rectified in the next two decades, with the
introduction of air-to-air refuelling, Airborne Early Warning and Control capability, new
joint strike fighters and airborne electronic attack, there remains one common limiting
factor; all of these platforms are land based. Given that air power is fundamental to sea
control and close air support for ground troops, Australia’s ability to conduct opposed
expeditionary operation against a formidable force will be restricted to regions where
land-based air power can reach and be sustained. 31 The importance of being able to
project air power at long distances from home base was a lesson the British learnt during
the Falklands. A lesson that has seen the British maintain a fixed-wing capability on
her carriers even though the Sea Harrier was decommissioned 2006. 32 It has achieved
this by using RAF GR7/7As Harriers which are now flown by both the RAF and the RN
under Joint Force Harrier, an organisation stood up in 2000. 33 Perhaps if the threat to
Australia from a formidable force becomes more apparent the Australian government
may realise the important role that the carrier-based aircraft played in the Falklands
War and once again consider this capability.
A Maritime Strategy is Joint
This entails a fundamentally maritime strategy, for which Australia
requires forces that can operate with decisive effect throughout the
northern maritime and littoral approaches to Australia, and the ADF’s
primary operational environment more generally. 34 -
The 1982 Falklands War proved to Britain that an island nation that wants a true
expeditionary capability must have a maritime strategy. Furthermore it demonstrated
the importance of joint operations where: ‘land, sea and air forces can operate in harmony
to exploit mobility and fire power in pursuit of national objectives’. 35 The importance of
joint operations saw the United Kingdom establish a Joint Force Operations staff and
develop doctrine for a Joint Headquarters and Joint Force Headquarters. 36 However, for
many years they lacked true joint doctrine regarding the operational-level planning and
integration of air/land/maritime operations. 37 The ADF is currently grappling with this
concept and although there is a plethora of doctrine and concepts developed by project
teams and the single Services; such as Army’s Next Step The Land Force - Expeditionary
in Orientation and Amphib 2014: Australia’s Amphibious Concept these are not owned
by a joint authority at the appropriate level. 38 The development and ownership of joint