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Sealing the STRAIT
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potential for greater accord between the states. Indeed, the real possibility that oil
might lie anywhere beneath the land or sea has prevented the establishment of any
standing agreement to accept the colonial borders. 78
Founded in 1981, the GCC includes Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman and
Qatar, and operates as a regional consortium with collective security responsibilities.
The Basic Law of the GCC stipulates that members must-cooperate in ‘all fields’;
the grand aim being broader political unification in a single state. However, since
its inception, it has become clear that the GCC is in practice little more than a loose
security institution based on needs for survival. Indeed, if the member states agree on
one objective, it is to maintain the ‘status-quo continuity’ of their political regimes. 79
Al Hamad agrees that the efficacy of the Council is dependent on the fear of threats. 80
However, the member states often differ in their perceptions of internal and external
threats and vulnerabilities, due to the various political, economic, dynastic, tribal,
territorial, and jurisdictional differences between them. For instance, Bahrain sees
Iran as its major external threat: 70 per cent of Bahraini citizens are Shiite and suffer
from harsher economic conditions in Bahrain, rendering them more receptive to Iran
revolutionary rhetoric. 81 In contrast, Kuwait continues to fear territorial expansion
from Iraq, an anxiety not shared by Oman and the UAE on the eastern side of the
peninsula. 82 The UAE is more concerned with condemning the Iranian occupation of
Abu Musa and the Tunbs. 83
The GCC Peninsular Shield
The GCC Peninsula Shield was created in 1986 as a land-based force of 9000 troops
stationed in Saudi Arabia. The base at King Khaled Military City was disbanded
in 2005-06, an event that highlighted the largely symbolic nature of GCC defence
cooperation and the reliance of the GCC on external defence forces. In 2008 the Shield
was officially re-established as a quick-reaction force of 22,000 troops based in their
home countries, to be administered by the GCC Secretariat. 84 In the event of a crisis,
personnel would be marshalled in the concerned region, and if needed the GCC states
would deploy further troops under their own national flags. The renewed force would
include air and naval power organised according to the capacity of each member state.
Yet a destabilising weakness of the Shield is the lack of consensus over what the alliance
should defend against. In addition, Kuwait, Oman, and the UAE demand the right to
command the force (rather than Saudi Arabia) once it enters into their respective
territories. 85 This reflects the fear of the smaller states that Saudi will gain too much
power in a comprehensively integrated defence strategy; a fact that continues to limit
their cooperation. These states view the intervention of external powers as preferable
to Saudi hegemony in a combined defence policy. 86