Download - Royal Australian Navy

supporting power projection from the sea
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The Australian Sea Basing Concept
Far from mimicking the US Navy and US Marine Corps large-scale concept, Australia
has started to tailor and scale their sea basing concept to exploit its advantages while
avoiding the significant costs. Australia’s sea basing concept does not fully replace
shore basing, but seeks to limit the requirement to build massive stockpiles ashore.
Recognising the size and resource restrictions of the ADF, it is not focused on the
development and deployment of a pre-positioned maritime force with an extra brigade’s
worth of equipment. 34 Current sea basing concepts are focused on ‘three elements:
C2, joint fires and logistics’. 35 In support of STOM and DO, the command element of
a brigade or battalion sized force can remain onboard ship, eliminating the need to
move headquarters staff and their equipment ashore. With modern communications
and situational awareness tools, joint fires can be coordinated and executed from the
sea based force. Similarly, shipboard land attack missile systems, long-range naval
guns and armed reconnaissance helicopters can provide necessary joint fires for
smaller operations, negating the need to move guns, ammunition and personnel ashore.
Again, doing this lessens the size of the landing force and subsequently the logistic
demand placed on the larger amphibious force. Logistically, keeping advanced medical
support and aircraft maintenance personnel onboard ship will again further reduce
the logistical burden of landing a force ashore. Finally, the reduction in stockpiling
ashore by providing spares, fuel, ammunition and stores directly to the end user from
the ship will facilitate supportability and enhance land manoeuvre.
Recommendations
As Australia’s sea basing concept develops, I believe there are a few shortcomings that
need to be addressed. First, the sea basing concept needs to be developed in a joint
environment that includes senior logistic and combat representatives from both the
land and maritime elements. This will ensure that each force element selected to remain
onboard the ship is acceptable to Army, while also ensuring Navy is able to properly
support it onboard ship. Also, consideration must be given as to when it is appropriate
to sea base, when a sea base should transition ashore, and when the availability of
amphibious ships will not support sea basing. I believe that the duration of some
operations requiring sea based support from amphibious ships will be of a length that
does not support sea basing. Also, the ability of Navy to establish and maintain a suitable
level of sea control to support and protect sea based operations for several weeks needs
to be confirmed. Finally, although the strategic sealift capability resident in Joint Project
2048C will go a long way to supporting a sea basing capability, I believe the strategic
sealift/resupply that is needed to support sea basing for a large amphibious operation
will require the procurement of further shipping. The need to provide sealift to areas
where commercial ships do not go, the carrying of specialised cargo, the requirement to
loiter on station for extended periods, and the risk of operating in an area of conflict could