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62 australian maritime issues 2009: spc-a annual
retaining large logistic afloat support – it was after all proving difficult enough to keep
even the active combat fleet up to scratch. As a result much of the battle-worn logistic
support force was either scrapped or held in reserve while wartime replenishment
doctrine and procedures remained more or less static. As for the fleet train concept,
which after all was the only successful working model they knew, this remained the
core component of early post-war Allied mobile logistic support doctrine – at least in
theory. It would take the North Korean invasion of the South to see whether the Allied
response would apply the theory once again into practice.
Commonwealth Naval Forces in the Korean War
Altogether some fifty-five warships of the Commonwealth navies served in the Korean
War for various periods: thirty-two from the Royal Navy (including five light fleet
carriers), nine from the Royal Australian Navy including a carrier, eight from the Royal
Canadian Navy and six from the Royal New Zealand Navy. Afloat support throughout
the war was provided by a fleet train which at various times called for a total of two
naval headquarter ships, a hospital ship, sixteen Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels and
two merchant fleet vessels. 3 The logistic support for the Commonwealth naval forces
in Korea worked as a coalition team with each navy contributing specialist support
vessels to form an effective afloat support whole.
Benign logistics framework
Given that both the RN and US Navy deployed the same type of auxiliary ships and
equipment originally assembled for the Pacific War five years earlier, the nature of mobile
logistic support more or less followed past precedent, but with some important differences.
Although the core purpose remained the same, that is to replenish carrier(s) on station,
this was about the only consistent aspect when comparing Korea to 1945. Korean naval
operations were much more modest in scale, numbers and tempo, and against a benign
threat at sea. They particularly benefited from the shorter transit time from the nearby host
nation support provided by Japan, including excellent repair and maintenance facilities.
In general terms the naval logistic forces eventually deployed in Korea just about
matched the demands placed upon them, particularly as the ramp up from American
reserves gathered pace. That said, there was one very important development that
posed a unique problem for American logisticians in Korea which had been totally
underestimated and would have enormous ramifications for future auxiliary design
and replenishment doctrine.
While in very broad terms, the Commonwealth naval forces operated without too many
hiccups because force levels remained relatively constant and mobile logistic support
was provided under relatively benign and predictable conditions. However it proved to
be a very different story for the American carrier task force of TF 77 roaming in the Sea