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60 australian maritime issues 2009: spc-a annual
Relevance of the 1945 Pacific Campaign to the US Navy and
the Royal Navy
Throughout the inter-war period British logistic plans had assumed that from a
geographical standpoint naval operations would remain relatively parochial, reflecting
broadly their experience during World War I. The Pacific was therefore never in the
forefront of strategic deliberations; any future deployments beyond Europe, particularly
to the Far East, were therefore expected to rely on a chain of bases and repair facilities
spread throughout the empire. Operations over long distances for extended periods
were consequently not considered likely and replenishing capital ships at sea was
largely ignored. 1 In contrast, the US Navy’s approach became more inclusive and
forward looking for the important reason that it had no choice. As the prospects of
war loomed, a two-ocean strategy became an essential consideration with the potential
Pacific threat posing some particularly unique and difficult logistical challenges due to
the distances involved and the lack of available American bases other than at Hawaii
and the Philippines. Thus each navy developed its logistic framework based on its
perception of, and confidence and capacity to meet the new, increasingly ominous
geostrategic threats of the late 1930s posed by Japan in the Far East and Germany
and Italy in Europe.
A key difference in philosophy between the two navies was on the future role of aircraft
carriers, which was partly due to how and, no less importantly, where these were likely
to be deployed. In truth, neither navy had foreseen even in the early years of the war,
the full strategic and logistic ramifications of operating carrier task forces, which would
partly explain why mobile logistic support for this type of warfare was not prioritised
until it was almost too late. While American plans nevertheless remained more or less
intact throughout the war, Britain’s pre-war plans for the Far East were turned upside
down by the fall of Singapore, with its large graving dock, as well as Hong Kong, thereby
effectively eliminating any fixed base logistic support in the region. The Pacific naval
campaigns of 1944-45 therefore required unprecedented access to afloat logistic support
operating at various forward or advanced bases across the Pacific, often thousands
of miles from Allied naval bases. For the British Pacific Fleet operating as part of the
American 3rd/5th Fleets its nearest naval base was Sydney, albeit still a long way from
the battle front. The resulting challenge of trying to sustain both amphibious support
operations and large-scale carrier task forces across a vast and constantly changing
battlespace was only resolved by creating an effective, if not necessarily efficient, fleet
train system designed to provide the necessary logistic support at sea. Only then could
carrier task forces remain for extended periods on station to achieve the necessary
strategic flexibility, mobility and endurance to win the Pacific War.