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Sealing the STRAIT
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and Oman is acutely aware that subsequent to any conflict, it will need to interact with
Iran as an economic partner and ally. Disengaging itself from, or making only a minor
contribution to, a conflict would prove easier for Oman because it exports all its energy
from a port off the Arabian Sea. One example of Oman’s hesitance to irritate Iran is its
rejection of a plan to construct a pipeline stretching from Saudi Arabia, across Oman
to the Arabian Sea. Such a development might offend Iran as it would expand the
capacity of alternative energy supply routes.
Possible Scenarios
In a scenario short of an all out war, where Iran might have a limited confrontation
with US naval forces in the strait, the GCC would likely maintain a low profile whilst
observing events as they unfold. Indeed, their socio-economic stability and future
political and economic relations with Iran would be dependent on minimal stated
involvement in a conflict. 104 Thus the GCC would privately urge the US to maintain
a tough stance against Iran, whilst publicly advancing a neutral posture to avoid the
wrath of Iran. This would necessarily include providing the US with access to Gulf
bases and overflight rights, with the assumption that it would not publicise this access.
In the event that Iran successfully developed nuclear weapons, analysts are divided
regarding the willingness of the Gulf States to host military contingents on their
shores. Whilst Henderson argues that the Gulf would be off limits for US aircraft
carriers and naval ships, Connell believes that the Gulf States would not reduce their
dependence on the US, which could not be prevented from entering the Gulf under
LOSC clauses governing freedom of navigation. 105 (Such debate demonstrates how
different assumptions create distinct predictions about a conflict in the strait, which
may in turn influence different policy recommendations.)
A regional wartime scenario
However, if Iran were to completely close the sea lane to maritime traffic, it is unlikely
that the GCC would remain neutral. An analysis of the GCC reactions will now be based
on the following scenario:
Provoked by a severe or existential threat, Iran carries out plans to
incrementally block, with the hope to control, the flow of energy exports
through the Strait of Hormuz. Both the Navy and the IRGC achieve this
by mining the approaches - perhaps exaggerating public statements
of the number and type of mines used - and mobilising small craft
equipped with anti-ship missiles. Iran is successful in temporarily
impeding maritime traffic due to the damage inflicted on oil tankers
and the ensuing uncertainty of risk. This is not only a maritime issue,
but a global energy concern, prompting the US to intervene with a