Download - Royal Australian Navy

Sealing the STRAIT
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Purpose
The circumstances prompting Iran to disrupt energy traffic through the Strait of Hormuz
are important for discussion and worthy of analysis in their own right (indeed they
have been covered substantially in relevant literature). The aim of this report is to
consider the capacity of Iran to exercise this action, and more extensively, to analyse
the probable reactions of the Gulf States. It will assume Iran has sealed the strait in
accordance with its current capabilities, and so address how the Gulf Arab states would
respond in this critical hypothetical scenario. Further, it will seek to highlight the
complexity of Gulf State cooperation in dealing with Iran, and whether a collective and
uniform response is even likely. The author aims to brief a general audience with little
assumed knowledge of the scenario – the very specific technical aspects of a military
confrontation are complex and not within the scope of this report.
Structure
Part one will detail the geography of the strait, its commercial and strategic significance,
territorial claims to islands within the channel, and the presence of military forces in
the region. It will then present a background to the geopolitical context of a conflict,
including the economic and political consequences of Iran closing the strait. It will also
describe Iran’s military capacity to do so. Part one will conclude with a discussion of
the international impact of a closure, including the implications for the global economy,
Shiite rebellion in support of Iran, and the socio-economic impact on the GCC states. It
will briefly consider the ways in which the consequences on the global oil trade could
be mitigated by the GCC oil and gas producers.
Part two is concerned with the probable reactions of the Gulf Arab states, namely
those of the GCC. It will first detail the attitudes of the Gulf States towards Iran, and
how these will serve to influence their respective reactions. It will then analyse the
GCC as it stands today, and critique the existing levels of cooperation. Next, assuming
Iran chooses to close the strait to all non-Iranian shipping, the report will outline the
most likely course of action the GCC will take. It is important to remember that the
GCC leaders would be at pains not to reveal their stance on such sensitive strategic
matters, and at best it is only possible to engage in informed speculation of their
reactions given historical precedents and strategic considerations. The report will
conclude with a discussion on how the international community might mitigate the
chance that Iran would seal the strait, and an analysis of the prospects for security
cooperation between the Gulf States.