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key lessons from the 1982 falkland islands campaign
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Expeditionary Orientation as a Maritime Strategy
The British could have won the war with nothing more than superiority
in sea control. 15
Australia relies almost entirely on the sea lines of communication for trade, it also
relies on this medium to conduct and sustain expeditionary operations offshore and
to a lesser extent on the mainland. Yet Australia’s ability to conduct such operations
was severely reduced during the late 1970s and into the early 1990s where the
strategic policy focused on ‘defence of Australia’. 16 Although this concept was not the
fortification of the continent as some commentators believe, it did see a shift away
from the requirement to conduct expeditionary operations. 17 During this period our
maritime force capability was reduced significantly with the loss of the aircraft carrier
and fixed-wing Fleet Air Arm and the retirement of the guided missile destroyers
without replacement in the late 1990s which left another major maritime capability
gap, that of a maritime air warfare capability. With only HMAS Tobruk (II) and the six
heavy landing craft, our ability to conduct amphibious operations was also very limited.
Capability gaps as significant as these take a long time to replace. Although Australia’s
maritime capability started to improve in the late 1990s with the introduction into
service of the Kanimbla class amphibious ships and continued into the 2000s with
the guided missile frigate upgrade program, these were, and continue to be, stop gap
measures. Significant maritime capability enhancements will not be seen until the
arrival of the Canberra class amphibious ship, Hobart class destroyers, strike weapons
and additional submarines which are to be introduced over the next two decades. 18
Similarly, the Royal Navy (RN) suffered significant maritime capability in the 1960s
when British governments adopted a continental ground strategy which favoured
the Army and Air Force at the expense of the Navy. 19 The Falklands War proved the
importance and worth of a capable maritime force that was able to: conduct amphibious
operations, provide the supply chain required to sustain the ground forces, and gain and
maintain sea control. 20 Britain established sea control very early in the war, although
the constant threat of Argentinean submarines meant that it was not totally one sided;
Britain had a significant advantage. 21 Sea control was such an important element of
the Falklands campaign for both sides that the side without it had very little chance of
ever winning the war, regardless of how proficient their land forces were. 22
The importance of sea control, amphibious operations and sea lift during the Falklands
War provides a key lesson for Australia in future planning. If Australia wants an
ADF that is capable of undertaking its principle and secondary tasks ‘to deter and
defend armed attacks on Australia independently [and] to contribute to stability in
the South Pacific and East Timor’ it must continue to be outward looking and adopt
the maritime strategy articulated in the 2000 Defence White Paper and reiterated in
the 2009 version. 23