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10 australian maritime issues 2009: spc-a annual
Now, there’s been much debate over how to balance traditional and irregular warfare
capabilities in our military. As an underpinning, I see this principle applying to both.
It chooses quality of people, training and systems over quantity of platforms. It means
that we choose to go small in number before we go hollow in capability. And it favors
innovation in leaders, in doctrine, in organisation and in technology. Precise and
principled force applies whether we are attacking an entrenched enemy or securing
the population. In either case, it protects the innocent. We protect the innocent. It’s
who we are. And in so doing, we better preserve both our freedom of action and our
security interests. Preserving our security interests is also better ensured by what I
consider my third and final principle. Policy and strategy should constantly struggle
with one another. Some in the military no doubt would prefer political leadership that
lays out a specific strategy and then gets out of the way, leaving the balance of the
implementation to commanders in the field. But the experience of the last nine years
tells us two things: a clear strategy for military operations is essential; and that strategy
will have to change as those operations evolve. In other words, success in these types
of wars is iterative; it is not decisive. There isn’t going to be a single day when we
stand up and say, that’s it, it’s over, we’ve won. We will win but we will do so only
over time and only after near constant reassessment and adjustment. Quite frankly,
it will feel a lot less like a knock-out punch and a lot more like recovering from a long
illness. The worst possible world I can imagine is one in which military commanders
are inventing or divining their strategies, their own remedies, in the absence of clear
political guidance, sometimes after an initial goal or mission has been taken over by
events. That’s why we have and need political leadership constantly immersed in the
week-to-week flow of the conflict, willing and able to adjust as necessary but always
leaving military commanders enough leeway to do what is expected of them. Policy
makers, after all, have other concerns beyond those of the military that must be
adequately considered when taking a nation to war, including cost, domestic support,
international reaction and so forth. At the same time, military leaders at all levels much
be completely frank about the limits of what military power can achieve, with what
risk and in what timeframe. We owe civilian leaders our candor in the decision making
process and our unwavering support once the decision is made. That doesn’t mean
every bit of military advice will be followed. We shouldn’t expect so. But it does mean
the military concerns will be properly considered. And we can ask for nothing more.
In this most recent Afghanistan/Pakistan strategy review, the President devoted an
extraordinary amount of time to getting it right, to understanding the nature of the fight
we are in and the direction in which he wanted to take it. And then he laid it out clearly,
simply, for the American people. And we are executing. In December he will review
where we are and how we are doing, and I think we should all be prepared to adjust if
events on the ground deem it necessary. The notion proffered by some that once set, a
war policy cannot be changed, or that to do so implies some sort of weakness, strikes me
not only as incompatible with our history but also as quite dangerous. Lincoln did not