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the enduring naval logistics lessons of world war II and korea
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What was the Main Logistics Issue of 1945?
Replenishment at sea, in general terms, had remained more or less in a state of arrested
development until 1943-44, primarily because neither navy foresaw, particularly during
the inter-war period, any overriding need for stretching this specialised capability any
further. British oiling-at-sea policy therefore remained essentially confined to convoy
escorts in the Atlantic while the US Navy’s experience was comparatively broader
but still minor in scale compared to their subsequent experience in the closing years
of the war. What no one had foreseen were the logistical implications of deploying
increasing numbers of new aircraft carriers as task groups to destroy enemy carriers
and to provide air based support for amphibious operations. The size of the Pacific
Ocean, the huge distances involved, combined with the speed and unprecedented
tempo of operations, all dictated the need for an imaginative and innovative logistical
solution. The answer, as we know, were vast fleet trains that could supply fuel, aircraft,
ammunition, provisions, mail, personnel and so on at sea as well as additional afloat
repair and support facilities in safe anchorages away from the battle front. These
solutions, indeed, significantly amplified the existing carrier capabilities. But while
the role and potency of carrier task forces were transformed, the very character of
logistic support had also changed profoundly. The Pacific in 1945 therefore became in
effect the defining moment in the history of mobile logistic support that would quickly
become regarded as the benchmark for future logistic planning and execution. 2
Once peace returned, it was not too long before many of the lessons gained from this
huge Pacific experience were relegated to history or forgotten. Recommendations for
new designs were effectively frozen, large swathes of ships were scrapped or sold or
placed in reserve and skill-sets decimated through demobilisation. Post-war austerity
forced navies to drastically cut back their post-war fleet plans and aspirations. It is
therefore against this backdrop that we should look at how the value of logistic support
was perceived in the post-war era.
Post-War Logistics
Having survived their critical baptism of fire (albeit on different scales) the post-war
navies had to question whether the fundamental paradigm shift in carrier task force
sustainability should remain the model for future naval logistic planning in peacetime.
Both navies had been forced to develop mobile logistic support almost entirely by trial
and error, a process that relied too heavily on improvisation to get the job done. The
hope and expectation was that a more informed and relevant procedure for preparing
fleet logistic plans would now be devised to ensure a better level of preparedness for
future contingencies. Yet there was no magic answer, given the growing prospect of
another possible global war which required maintaining properly prepared armed forces
on the one hand while, conversely, the combination of peacetime economic realignment
and massive reduction in operational tempo effectively torpedoed any justification for