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98 australian maritime issues 2009: spc-a annual<br />

defence agreements with the US should not indicate that the GCC is ready to take<br />

sides. In March 2010, speculation surfaced that Qatar, Oman and Kuwait had signed<br />

bilateral security pacts with Iran, forbidding the use of their territory for launching<br />

attacks against it (whether this included attacks by external powers is unclear). 99<br />

This in turn is complicated by the presence of the US Air Force at Al Udaid, where US<br />

Central Command has a forward headquarters, demonstrating the balancing act that<br />

the Gulf States must play to appease both the West and Iran in peacetime.<br />

Bahrain<br />

Bahrain hosts the US <strong>Navy</strong>’s Fifth Fleet (US Naval command has maintained a presence<br />

in Bahrain since February 1948), and as a close US ally has strained political relations<br />

with Iran. These have not been tempered by international condemnation of Iran’s<br />

suspected nuclear enrichment program. Indeed, Bahraini officials have stated their<br />

suspicions that Iran is violating its non-proliferation obligations, and in 2007 Bahrain<br />

rejected Iran’s offer to support its own nuclear energy program. Retired US <strong>Navy</strong> Vice<br />

Admiral Charles Moore Jr quotes the late ruler Sheikh Essa bin Salman Al Khalifa:<br />

The ships and aircraft of the Fifth Fleet are a mountain of fire that<br />

separates us from the Iranians, and that presence of naval forces is<br />

what has given us peace and prosperity. 100<br />

In February 2009, Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, adviser to Supreme Leader Ayatollah<br />

Khomeini, purportedly claimed sovereignty over Bahraini soil, rekindling past tensions<br />

over Iranian territorial ambitions. Tehran proceeded to deny the claim that Bahrain was<br />

once the 14th province of Iran; however Bahrain chose to freeze LNG negotiations and<br />

banned Iranian vessels from Bahraini waters. 101 The two countries had been in bilateral<br />

talks to establish a gas agreement whereby Bahrain would import around one billion cf<br />

of LNG per day from Iran’s South Pars field. Bahrain only reopened discussions once<br />

Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki travelled to Bahrain and offered an official apology.<br />

This instance reinforced the mistrust between Sunni-led Arab states and Shiite Iran<br />

– Saudi Arabia is particularly concerned with the power of Iran to influence Shiite<br />

Muslims in the GCC countries as well as Iraq, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. 102 Yet like its<br />

GCC counterparts, Bahrain is concerned with accommodating Iranian interests to deter<br />

aggression. It recognises that Iran will always be a major component of the geo-political<br />

landscape in the Gulf, and therefore greater diplomatic ties and agreements (including<br />

business and banking concessions) are important for maintaining regional stability. 103<br />

Oman<br />

Oman’s position on Iran diverges somewhat from that of its Gulf neighbours. It is<br />

possible that Oman would avoid heavy involvement in a conflict vis-à-vis Iran in an<br />

effort to preserve bilateral relations. Any military conflict would probably be short-lived,

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