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152 australian maritime issues 2009: spc-a annual<br />

An expeditionary force will be required to train regularly together. A review of<br />

amphibious training activities over the last ten years would indicate that the Army’s 3rd<br />

Brigade has provided the land force component. 29 Yet surprisingly, when short notice<br />

operational tasking has occurred, such as Operation PADANG ASSIST, elements of the<br />

1st Brigade were deployed, even though no recent joint training had occurred between<br />

the Brigade and naval elements. In addition, operational tempo and maintenance cycles<br />

are limiting the ability to conduct individual and collective training. 30 What is of more<br />

concern is that work-up exercises between the amphibious ships and other elements<br />

likely to make up the Amphibious Ready Element (ARE) and Amphibious Ready Group<br />

(ARG) is not occurring at all. 31 If the ADF was required to deploy an ARE and ARG<br />

at short notice to conduct a potentially contested operation in the region, the current<br />

training regimes do not provide sufficient time for familiarisation between elements<br />

of the task group. Due to operational tempo, the situation is worse for the C-17s and<br />

C-130s and the air deployable elements in the ADF.<br />

Although the ADF has a history of conducting expeditionary operations, and is currently<br />

conducting them, the ADF does not have a structured, programmed training regime<br />

to develop and maintain the skills required to conduct expeditionary operations. This<br />

implies that the ADF does not have an expeditionary orientation and unless changes<br />

are made to the ADF’s training and exercise schedule in the immediate future, it is<br />

unlikely to be able to fully exploit the capability provided by the LHDs in 2014.<br />

Conclusion<br />

This paper has examined the ADF to determine if it is truly a joint force with an<br />

expeditionary orientation. The command and control function and the equipment<br />

procurement process of the ADF are clearly designed to facilitate a joint, interoperable<br />

ADF. Combined with this the joint training for logistics and support trades is ensuring<br />

that common process and procedures are employed across the three Services. The<br />

single Service equipment management agencies and organisations like JLC and JHSA<br />

are not only saving resources, but also improving the interoperability of the ADF.<br />

Unfortunately, this interoperability does not extend into the combat elements, where<br />

real savings for the ADF are possible.<br />

The current single Service stove-pipes of the ADF still maintain a strong influence and<br />

control over the employment of the ADF. The JOC OPR should dictate to the Services<br />

the quantity and type of forces required by the ADF, however, as resources are not<br />

assigned with the JOC OPR serials, the Services control the force structure of the<br />

ADF. In addition, the doctrine process of the ADF is broken as it is not being directed<br />

by higher-level joint concepts. Even the process of managing the ADF workforce is<br />

controlled by the Services, thereby not allowing effective and efficient management of<br />

the total workforce. This is particularly relevant to those trades and skills necessary to<br />

ensure that the ADF has a balanced workforce necessary for expeditionary operations.

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