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132 australian maritime issues 2009: spc-a annual<br />
Conclusion<br />
So what does all this mean for the ADF and future operations by a maritime<br />
expeditionary force? Well, all three Services, but particularly the <strong>Australian</strong> Army,<br />
need to get behind the latest strategic and operational developments in maritime<br />
expeditionary operations. This will involve a significant cultural change as well as some<br />
structural change. There are many options for Army: it may decide to develop into an<br />
equivalent Marine organisation in its entirety, or it may be necessary to redesignate<br />
a specialist Marine Brigade Group (equivalent to a US Marine Expeditionary Brigade).<br />
Whatever decisions are made in future, it is clear that Adaptive Campaigning needs to<br />
refocus the <strong>Australian</strong> Army’s attitude, and its level of commitment to a truly effective<br />
maritime expeditionary force.<br />
Notes<br />
1<br />
Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, A Concise History of Warfare, Collins, London,<br />
1968, p. 356.<br />
2<br />
Adaptive campaigning is defined as ‘actions taken by the land forces as part of the military<br />
contribution to a whole of government approach to resolving conflicts’. See <strong>Australian</strong> Army,<br />
Complex Warfighting, Canberra, 2004; Adaptive Campaigning, Canberra, 2006; as well as the<br />
17 April 2009 draft of <strong>Australian</strong> Army, Adaptive Campaigning: Army’s Future Land Operating<br />
Concept (AC-FLOC), Canberra, 2009.<br />
3<br />
Joint land force is defined as ‘the Army, including special operations, and those elements of the<br />
<strong>Navy</strong>, Air Force and, other government agencies, including cyber and space capabilities, that<br />
support land operations’. (AC-FLOC Draft April 2009, p. ix); and ‘This entails a fundamentally<br />
maritime strategy, for which Australia requires forces that can operate with decisive effect<br />
throughout the northern maritime and littoral approaches to Australia, and the ADF’s primary<br />
operational environment more generally’, in Department of Defence, Defending Australia in<br />
the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, Canberra, 2009, p. 59.<br />
4<br />
Many of the ideas presented in this paper are not new. The fundamentals of sea power are<br />
described in Geoffrey Till’s book, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, 2nd edn,<br />
Routledge, London, 2009, chapters 3, 8 and 9 are especially important for this paper. <strong>Navy</strong><br />
doctrine is also essential reading: <strong>Royal</strong> <strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Navy</strong>, <strong>Australian</strong> Maritime Doctrine<br />
(AMD): RAN Doctrine 1, Sea Power Centre - Australia, Canberra, 2000. Note the <strong>Navy</strong>’s 2010<br />
update of AMD, released by the Chief of <strong>Navy</strong> on 4 June 2010 has particularly embraced the<br />
expeditionary concepts developed over the last decade or so.<br />
5<br />
An expeditionary force is defined as ‘a force projected from the home base capable of sustained<br />
operations at distance from that home base’ (<strong>Australian</strong> Maritime Doctrine 2010, using JWP