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132 australian maritime issues 2009: spc-a annual<br />

Conclusion<br />

So what does all this mean for the ADF and future operations by a maritime<br />

expeditionary force? Well, all three Services, but particularly the <strong>Australian</strong> Army,<br />

need to get behind the latest strategic and operational developments in maritime<br />

expeditionary operations. This will involve a significant cultural change as well as some<br />

structural change. There are many options for Army: it may decide to develop into an<br />

equivalent Marine organisation in its entirety, or it may be necessary to redesignate<br />

a specialist Marine Brigade Group (equivalent to a US Marine Expeditionary Brigade).<br />

Whatever decisions are made in future, it is clear that Adaptive Campaigning needs to<br />

refocus the <strong>Australian</strong> Army’s attitude, and its level of commitment to a truly effective<br />

maritime expeditionary force.<br />

Notes<br />

1<br />

Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, A Concise History of Warfare, Collins, London,<br />

1968, p. 356.<br />

2<br />

Adaptive campaigning is defined as ‘actions taken by the land forces as part of the military<br />

contribution to a whole of government approach to resolving conflicts’. See <strong>Australian</strong> Army,<br />

Complex Warfighting, Canberra, 2004; Adaptive Campaigning, Canberra, 2006; as well as the<br />

17 April 2009 draft of <strong>Australian</strong> Army, Adaptive Campaigning: Army’s Future Land Operating<br />

Concept (AC-FLOC), Canberra, 2009.<br />

3<br />

Joint land force is defined as ‘the Army, including special operations, and those elements of the<br />

<strong>Navy</strong>, Air Force and, other government agencies, including cyber and space capabilities, that<br />

support land operations’. (AC-FLOC Draft April 2009, p. ix); and ‘This entails a fundamentally<br />

maritime strategy, for which Australia requires forces that can operate with decisive effect<br />

throughout the northern maritime and littoral approaches to Australia, and the ADF’s primary<br />

operational environment more generally’, in Department of Defence, Defending Australia in<br />

the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, Canberra, 2009, p. 59.<br />

4<br />

Many of the ideas presented in this paper are not new. The fundamentals of sea power are<br />

described in Geoffrey Till’s book, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, 2nd edn,<br />

Routledge, London, 2009, chapters 3, 8 and 9 are especially important for this paper. <strong>Navy</strong><br />

doctrine is also essential reading: <strong>Royal</strong> <strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Navy</strong>, <strong>Australian</strong> Maritime Doctrine<br />

(AMD): RAN Doctrine 1, Sea Power Centre - Australia, Canberra, 2000. Note the <strong>Navy</strong>’s 2010<br />

update of AMD, released by the Chief of <strong>Navy</strong> on 4 June 2010 has particularly embraced the<br />

expeditionary concepts developed over the last decade or so.<br />

5<br />

An expeditionary force is defined as ‘a force projected from the home base capable of sustained<br />

operations at distance from that home base’ (<strong>Australian</strong> Maritime Doctrine 2010, using JWP

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