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is the adf too stove-piped to effectively undertake expeditionary operations?
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The ADF does not seem to have an expeditionary orientation and the concept is
interpreted differently by the three Services. In less than five years, the first of the
LHDs will provide the ADF with an unprecedented expeditionary capability. Yet the ADF
does not have the training or exercise regime in place to ensure that the appropriate
competencies are developed. Given the lack of infrastructure in the region and the
likely ADF tasks, unless a training regime is developed now, the ADF will be unable
to make maximum use of this capability. The current single Service stove-pipes are
inhibiting the ability of the ADF in moving towards a truly joint expeditionary force.
Unless these stove-pipes are broken down, it is unlikely that the ADF will be able to
undertake effective expeditionary operations in the immediate future.
Notes
1
Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, Canberra,
2009, p. 52. This document is also known as the 2009 Defence White Paper.
2
The first of the new amphibious ships (LHDs), HMAS Canberra, is scheduled for introduction
into service in 2014, with the second ship, HMAS Adelaide, scheduled for 2015. Defence
Material Organisation, Projects - JP 2048 Phase 4A/B - Amphibious Ships, (1 November 2009).
3
In his autobiography, General Peter Cosgrove highlights a number of near misses for the
force that deployed to East Timor in 1999. General Peter Cosgrove, My Story, HarperCollins
Publishers, Sydney, 2006. Dr Bob Breen provides similar examples, in ‘Problems of an
Expeditionary Force: First Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment in 1965’, Australian
Defence Force Journal, No. 60, September/October 1986, pp. 29-38; Struggling for Self-Reliance:
Four Case Studies of Australian Regional Force Projection in the late 1980s and the 1990s, ANU
E-Press, Canberra, 2008.
4
The US led 1990-91 Gulf War and 2003 Iraq War were both joint operations, conducted with
sufficient warning to ensure that forces were able to build up sufficient logistics supplies to
easily complete the assigned tasks. The clearly defined chain of command and joint forces
commander ensure clear direction for the combat elements. Major William D Dries Jr, Future
Counterland Operations: Common Lessons from Three Conflicts, United States Army Command
and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2003, pp. 6-11; Operation PALLISER
effectively employed troops trained and prepared for joint operations and with a clearly defined
joint task force commander. This operation is a good example of the benefits of establishing
a joint headquarters and conducting joint training. Larry J Woods and Colonel Timothy
R Reese, Military Interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons from a Failed State, The Long War
Series Occasional Paper 28, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May
2008, pp. 60-5; The British operation to retake the Falkland Islands proved to be successful,
however, the failure of the force to be prepared for long range amphibious operations and