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180 australian maritime issues 2009: spc-a annual
Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century addresses what are substantial
deficiencies in Australia’s current force structure, that of the ability to independently
conduct and sustain expeditionary operations and implement effective sea denial and
control. However, there continues to be considerable debate over the type of maritime
force structure that Australia should have. A few, like Hugh White, are focused on sea
denial through the use of submarines and strike aircraft and opposed to ‘wasting’ our
limited defence budget on expensive surface ships such as the AWDs. 24 Paul Dibb
on the other hand argues that Australia should not neglect any of the elements of a
capable maritime force such as mine and anti-submarine warfare through the use of
both sub-surface and surface ships. 25 Furthermore, Dibb asks the question:
Have we moved away from the defence of Australia and our regional
commitments as the primary drivers of the force structure to an
expeditionary force primarily designed for operations alongside our
US ally in places such as the Middle East? 26
I would argue that ‘expeditionary’ is not the issue and that the ADF should have an
expeditionary orientation. However, Paul Dibb may be correct when he questions
whether our force structure is being influenced by current operations (conflicts of choice)
and the need to maintain our alliance with the US. But more to the point the strain that
the current counter-insurgency operations in Middle East are placing on the ADF may
be hampering its ability to make the necessary changes in structure and culture that
are required to meet the challenges of Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century.
Air Capability as Part of a Maritime Strategy
For the British, lack of host nation accessibility excluded participation
of the Royal Air Force fighters. They had not envisioned a situation
in which responsibility for air superiority would rest solely upon the
shoulders of their jump jets. 27
Neither Britain nor Argentina had air forces that were capable of meeting the geographic
challenges of the Falklands War. The Royal Air Force (RAF) was structured to meet
NATO commitments in Europe and the Argentinean Air Force for possible conflicts with
its South American neighbours. 28 For Britain the predominant issue was the lack of a
friendly air base which could be used to attain air control over the Falkland Islands.
This meant that it had to rely on organic air power provided by the Harriers on board
the carrier groups. For the Argentineans their main strike aircraft had to operate at
the boundaries of their fuel limits and rely on two tankers, which further restricted
their ability to sustain operations. This meant that both sides lacked the required air
forces to establish air superiority. Furthermore, Britain’s lack of an airborne early
warning platform, which severely limited their ability to intercept; resulted in the
force being subjected to low flying attacks from both aircraft and missiles. 29 Above all,