SEEU Review vol. 5 Nr. 2 (pdf) - South East European University

SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009
Justice and Fairness
In the first formulation of justice as fairness it is stated that the decisive
part of the concept of justice is fairness. Justice is claimed as a virtue of the
institutions and practices, and the principles of justice are considered as
formulating restrictions for the institutions that define the authority, powers,
liabilities, rights and duties (Rawls, 1999, 47). However, Rawls confines
himself to the sense of justice in relation to practices. It is not a
comprehensive view of good society but a part of it. He just focuses on the
common sense of justice, which requires a balance between competing
considerations.
For Rawls, fairness refers to “right dealing between persons who are
cooperating with or competing against one another”. The question of fairness
emerges when free and equal persons engage in a joint activity whose rules
are defined and accepted by them and determine the respective shares and
burdens. The practice is fair since nobody obtains illegitimate advantages.
One sees a claim as legitimate when everybody in the practice acknowledges
it as reasonable. A fair practice supports respective positions against the
background of the mutual understanding of the principles by free persons
who are equal as regards with authority (Rawls, 1999, 59). A true
community presupposes mutual acknowledgments of principles. In addition,
fairness applies to the voluntary practices (like in games and business
competition) whereas justice to the practices where there is no option to
enter (like in slavery) (Rawls, 1999, 59).Therefore, to change unjust
practices is more urgent in order to change unfair ones (Rawls, 1999, 60).
In a fair practice, parties acknowledge a “prima facie duty” against each
other and corresponding “prima facie right” in tune with the practice. One
whose liberty is restricted because of the rules of practice he entered into has
the right over the others who benefit from his submission to the restriction. It
is the consequence of a fair practice (voluntarily undertaken) from that each
person benefits. The rights and duties here are not the obligatory results of a
contract or promise but they are based on “previous actions voluntarily
undertaken, in this case on the parties having engaged in a common practice
and knowingly accepted its benefits”. Political obligation does not suppose
voluntary act as it is thought in the social contract theory. Fairness apples to
voluntary practice while justice to involuntary one. In the former, “prima
facie obligation” may be overridden whereas in the latter, one can not escape
from the obligation only because obedience is required. Otherwise, the
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