SEEU Review vol. 5 Nr. 2 (pdf) - South East European University

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Arjeta VOKSHI-ABAZI and Sulo HADERI Table1. Functional independence of central banks Central Bank Main objectives Secondary objectives ECB Maintain price stability Supports European Community economic policies that do not affect the objective of price stability Albania other objectives like exchange rate Achieve and maintain stability will not obstacle price stability achievement of price stability Bosnia – Herzegovina Achieve and maintain national currency stability….. by applying a currency board arrangement Bulgaria Contribute to the will support economic policies that maintenance of the do not interfere with the main stability of the national objective currency… Croatia Macedonia Montenegro Rumania Serbia Turkey Achieve and maintain price stability Maintain price stability No conditions Ensure and maintain price stability Achieve and maintain price stability Achieve and maintain price stability will support economic policies that do not interfere with the main objective will support financial stability and economic policies that do not interfere with the main objective will support general economic policies that do not interfere with the main objective will support financial stability and economic policies that do not interfere with the main objective will support economic growth and employment policies that do not interfere with the main objective Source: Sandra Dvorsky “Central Bank Independence in Southeastern Europe with a view to European integration”, International Journal of Monetary Economics and Finance, Volume 1, Number 3 / 2008 Pages: 302 - 328 The Euro zone model forbids the Central Banks European System to get instructions from other institutions or bodies, or from government’s 56
SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 members 10 . The European Central Bank members mandate is 8 years; minimum 5 years 11 and they can not be reappointed. According to the statute, the governor of a Central Bank can be dismissed only when he doesn’t accomplish his/her duties or when (s)he is a bad manager of the central bank 12 . To avoid bad management, chief executive officers must have a high level of professional qualification 13 . Southeastern Europe central banks have a high level of institutional independence because these banks generally are independent from other institutions in achieving their objectives. We say “generally” because the law of the central bank in Macedonia and the law of the central bank in Serbia states that the central bank must coordinate with the respective government for the achievement of its objectives. So, these central banks are not free to state their monetary policy. Southeastern European central banks match one of the conditions of the Tractate - the mandate of the governor and the mandate of Supervisory Council members is generally above 5 years, and the governor and chief executive officers must be experienced and have academic titles. The laws determine the incompatibility of the position of Supervisory Council member with other functions. Also the governor is dismissed when he commits a crime, makes fake declarations, misses the Council meetings, etc. The laws of Southeastern Europe countries are somewhat problematic when we discuss about the Supervisory Council members dismissal. Some of the articles must be reduced and simplified. Financial independence is made of two components: limits to government lending and budgetary independence. Some of the countries that we are studying prohibit direct credit to the government. So, they have solved the problem of financial independence. Albania and Serbia do not prohibit direct credit to the government 14 . Croatia, Albania, Montenegro and Serbia do not prohibit indirect credit to the government 15 . Only Bosnia – Herzegovina prohibits both direct and indirect credit (they have currency board). Also to the ownership and management of the budget is a very important component. In Albania, Croatia, Macedonia and Romania the capital is owned by the state. In table 2 is given the information about the second component (budgetary independence). There can be noticed that the central banks allocate part of their profit to the reserve fund. These banks also allocate the residual profit to government budget. 10 11 12 13 14 15 Article 108 of Tractate and article 7 of Statute Articles 11 (2) and 14 (2) of the Statute Article 14 (2) of the statute Article 112 (2) (b) of Tractate and article 11.2 of statute Direct crediting is allowed in special cases and it is well controlled Central banks can buy treasury bonds in the secondary market. 57
Page 1 and 2:
UNIVERSITETI I EVROPËS JUGLINDORE
Page 3:
Contents Foreword by the Editor in
Page 6: UEJL për këshillat e tij në koh
Page 9 and 10: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 J
Page 13 and 14: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 f
Page 17 and 18: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 c
Page 19 and 20: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 j
Page 21 and 22: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 T
Page 23 and 24: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 a
Page 25 and 26: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 1
Page 27 and 28: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 c
Page 29 and 30: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 t
Page 31 and 32: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 e
Page 33 and 34: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 R
Page 37 and 38: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 n
Page 41 and 42: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 A
Page 43 and 44: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 w
Page 47 and 48: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 i
Page 49 and 50: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 M
Page 51 and 52: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 G
Page 53 and 54: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009
Page 55: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 L
Page 59 and 60: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 L
Page 61 and 62: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 t
Page 63 and 64: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 o
Page 65 and 66: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 g
Page 69 and 70: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 A
Page 75 and 76: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 L
Page 77 and 78: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 H
Page 83 and 84: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 S
Page 87 and 88: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 h
Page 91 and 92: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 H
Page 93 and 94: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 s
Page 97 and 98: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 m
Page 101 and 102: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 P
Page 103 and 104: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 I
Page 105 and 106: SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 e
Page 107 and 108:
SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 1
Page 109 and 110:
SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 C
Page 111 and 112:
SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009
Page 113 and 114:
SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 D
Page 115 and 116:
SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 g
Page 117 and 118:
SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 T
Page 119 and 120:
SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 a
Page 121 and 122:
SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 d
Page 123 and 124:
SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 R
Page 125 and 126:
SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 S
Page 127 and 128:
SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009
Page 129 and 130:
SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 W
Page 131 and 132:
SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 M
Page 133 and 134:
SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 I
Page 135 and 136:
SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009 9
Page 138 and 139:
138 Reviewers: Benjamin Keatinge Dr
Page 140 and 141:
Iranda Bajrami, MA kanë qenë të
Page 142 and 143:
Iranda Bajrami, MA a state of c
Page 144 and 145:
Iranda Bajrami, MA to read and use
Page 146 and 147:
Iranda Bajrami, MA Classrooms were
Page 148 and 149:
Iranda Bajrami, MA the characterist
Page 150 and 151:
Iranda Bajrami, MA Not all the t
Page 152 and 153:
Iranda Bajrami, MA reinforce studen
Page 154 and 155:
Iranda Bajrami, MA References 1. Am
Page 156 and 157:
Iranda Bajrami, MA Appendix A Facto
Page 158 and 159:
Iranda Bajrami, MA Appendix B Obser
Page 160 and 161:
Iranda Bajrami, MA 22. Classroom en
Page 162 and 163:
Iranda Bajrami, MA Appendix C Stude
Page 164 and 165:
Iranda Bajrami, MA 9. 10. 11. 12. 1
Page 166 and 167:
Iranda Bajrami, MA Appendix D Teach
Page 168 and 169:
Iranda Bajrami, MA 18. 19. 20. 21.
Page 170 and 171:
Iranda Bajrami, MA Consistent with
Page 172 and 173:
172 Reviewers: Prof. Dr. Kadri Sule
Page 174 and 175:
Mentor Hamiti, Visar Shehu and Agni
Page 176 and 177:
Page 178 and 179:
Page 180 and 181:
Page 182 and 183:
Page 184 and 185:
Page 186 and 187:
Page 188 and 189:
Page 190 and 191:
Page 192 and 193:
Page 194 and 195:
194 Reviewers: Prof. Dr. Robert Sch
Page 196 and 197:
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Gezim Xhaferi and
Page 198 and 199:
Page 200 and 201:
Page 202 and 203:
Page 204 and 205:
Page 206 and 207:
Page 208 and 209:
Page 210 and 211:
Page 212 and 213:
212 Reviewers: Prof. Dr. Selim Jusu
Page 214 and 215:
Fatmir Faiku, Haxhere Faiku, Murtez
Page 216 and 217:
Page 218 and 219:
Page 220 and 221:
show all

SEEU Review vol. 5 Nr. 2 (pdf) - South East European University

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?