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SEEU Review vol. 5 Nr. 2 (pdf) - South East European University

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Dr. Ercan Gündoğan<br />

practice should be rejected at the outset and any enjoyment of the benefits<br />

should be avoided (Rawls, 1999, 60).<br />

Fairness requires reciprocity and community and hence a just practice<br />

requires more than the effective realization of wants and interests. For this<br />

reason, Rawls builds his notion of justice as fairness through direct and<br />

indirect references to utilitarianism (together with intuitionism).<br />

Utilitarianism assimilates the conception of justice into bene<strong>vol</strong>ence and its<br />

modern representative, welfare economics, into the question of efficient<br />

organization of institutions to increase the general welfare (Rawls, 1999, 64).<br />

Practically, the principle of justice here is a product of administrative<br />

decisions in relation to maximization of utility in terms of marginal values.<br />

Utility functions of individuals are accepted as the same and the satisfaction<br />

of desires is considered independently from the interpersonal moral relations<br />

(Rawls, 1999, 65). The ultimate aim is to maximize the general utility<br />

function. Actually, the principles of justice are reduced to public policy<br />

problem of institutions. There is also an extreme individualism in the<br />

utilitarianism, which regards persons moving towards separate directions<br />

(Rawls, 1999, 66). It is assumed that burdens and benefits are impartially<br />

distributed whereas justice as understood as efficiency evaluates a justice<br />

practice in terms of its advantages and disadvantages without concerning any<br />

accepted principle of respective values (Rawls, 1999, 67). The relation<br />

between slaveholder and slave is interpreted from a utilitarian point of view<br />

is seen unjust since it produces advantages for slaveholder without<br />

compensating disadvantages for slave and society because of the inefficient<br />

organization of labour. Slavery can be accepted from many reasons<br />

(advancement according to the previous practices, inherited from past,<br />

satisfaction of desire) and the reasons may be relevant. However, person<br />

thinking so “is guilt of a moral fallacy”. “There is disorder in his conception<br />

of the ranking of moral principles” (Rawls, 1999, 68). Slavery has no<br />

mutually acknowledged principles and no moral claim to the advantages.<br />

Slave meets the existing interests effectively but “the satisfaction of these<br />

claims is without weight and cannot enter into any tabulation of advantages<br />

and disadvantages” (Rawls, 1999, 69).<br />

However, a general moral conception cannot provide public recognition<br />

of a conception of justice in democratic state, observes Rawls. (This state<br />

goes back to the Wars of Religion after Reformation era and follows the<br />

principle of toleration, the growth of the constitutional government and large<br />

market economies). It requires a political conception of justice and refers to<br />

the necessary acknowledgment of the phenomena of diversity and the<br />

principle of pluralism as regards the doctrines and the conceptions of goods<br />

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