SEEU Review vol. 5 Nr. 2 (pdf) - South East European University

Dr. Ercan Gündoğan
A just society is regulated by “a public conception of justice” (Rawls,
1971, 4-5). In such a society, each person acknowledges the same principles
of justice, as the basic institutions of society meet and is known to meet
these principles of justice (Rawls, 1971, 5).
The conception of justice with its aspect of fairness insures a background
for “a public acceptance of the corresponding principles of justice”. Rawls
observes that membership for a society is not a voluntary act. However, a
society is closer to “a voluntary schema” when the principles of justice as
fairness operate therein. In this way, “its members are autonomous and the
obligation they recognize self-imposed” (Rawls, 1971, 13).
After TJ is published, Rawls tries to eliminate from his theory the claims
about “universal truth”, or “the essential nature and identity of persons”. “In
a constitutional democracy the public conception of justice should be, so far
as possible, independent of controversial philosophical and religious
doctrines”. The principle of toleration also must be applied to the philosophy
itself (Rawls, 1999, 388). Moreover, it is suggested that justice as fairness
can be conceived as political and that this type of conception is needed in a
democratic society. Rawls states that he did not sufficiently emphasis the
political character of his conception of justice before. However, justice as
fairness applied to “‘the basic structure’ of a modern constitutional
democracy” (Rawls, 1999, 389). It is a liberal view and not a comprehensive
moral doctrine governing all life beyond the basic structure of society.
Liberalism recognises conflicting and incommensurable conceptions of the
good in the constitutional democratic state. In addition, a viable political
conception of justice rejects the autocratic use of the state power (Rawls,
1999, 408). It may impose some constraints over the individuals and
associations in accordance with the requirements of the political justice in
the basic structure of the society.
Rawls indeed eliminates abstract conceptions such as essential nature and
identity of person: Person is conceived as political, as a citizen. He argues
that the ideals of “autonomy” and “individuality” are not essential to
liberalism as a political doctrine. Any such ideals, when conceived as
comprehensive ones, are not compatible with the other “conceptions of
good, with forms of personal, moral, and religious life consistent with
justice” although their role in the development of liberalism is seen as in
Kant and Mill. Otherwise, liberalism becomes another sectarian doctrine
(Rawls, 1999, 409).
14