SEEU Review vol. 5 Nr. 2 (pdf) - South East European University

Dr. Ercan Gündoğan
citizens”. This agreement can be maintained only if “we try, so far as we
can, to avoid disputed philosophical, as well as disputed moral and religious,
questions”. We should “recognize” that “there is no way to resolve them
politically” (Rawls, 1999, 394). Otherwise, “the only alternative to a
principle of toleration is the autocratic state power”. However, Rawls
observes that since the era of Reformation, “on the questions of religious and
moral doctrine, public agreement on the basic questions of philosophy
cannot be obtained without the state’s infringement of basic liberties”
(Rawls, 1999, 395).
Public agreement over the deep divisions requires state intervention. This
means that if state intervention is not wanted, deep divisions have to be put
aside for the theory of justice as fairness. But, we may wonder how the
theory of justice can work in case the principle of toleration does not operate
and requires the state to intervene. In addition, controversial thing is that
who tolerates whom. Furthermore, toleration presupposes the acceptance of
division and not implies to surpass that. However, this is not a problem for
Rawls, who want to turn them into manageable, reasonable level. If he tried
to surpass the divisions that lead into conflict, he could not be content with
the idea of public agreement based on the principles of justice and hence,
should not have started with this inter-subjectivism, and at least he had to
apply to a Hegelian dialectic suggesting the state’s solution to the problem.
For the idea of social cooperation, we need “publicly recognized rules and
procedures”. Cooperation requires “the idea of fair terms of cooperation”
and “an idea of each participant’s rational advantage, or good” (Rawls, 1999,
396). Here, Rawls seems to mean that ideas need ideas to realise themselves
and remain as ideas.
Person: As for the “idea of the person”, he or she can be a citizen, who is
free and equal as regards other citizens. The concept of “free” refers to the
virtue of “moral powers and the power of reason, thought, and judgment
connected with those powers”. The adjective “equal” applies to the persons
being “fully cooperating members of society” basing on the virtue of their
moral powers. Here, the meaning of equality is a condition in which
“persons can be full participants in a fair system of social cooperation”
(Rawls, 1999, 397). Rawls sees the person not only as moral and normative
(despite not basing on a comprehensive moral doctrine) but in fact
“political”, or in relation to “a conception of citizen”; very practicable and
concrete, rather than something like “human nature” in the social or natural
science (Rawls, 1999, 397, n15).
In a fair system of just society of Rawls, citizen, who is free and equal, is
ascribed two moral powers (Rawls, 1999, 397): “a capacity for a sense of
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