SEEU Review vol. 5 Nr. 2 (pdf) - South East European University
SEEU Review vol. 5 Nr. 2 (pdf) - South East European University
SEEU Review vol. 5 Nr. 2 (pdf) - South East European University
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<strong>SEEU</strong> <strong>Review</strong> Volume 5, No. 2, 2009<br />
given policy? Cani (2008) suggests that a higher transparency level will<br />
increase the monetary policy efficiency and transparency through its impact<br />
(effect) on the expectations of economic agents. Also a well informed public<br />
may help the Central Bank in the case of a conflict with the government. The<br />
high level of transparency and responsibility is positively related to the<br />
increase of central bank reputation.<br />
Even the implementation of Inflation Targeting Regime requires a high<br />
level of central bank transparency. One of the elements that may increase<br />
the level of transparency is the Supervisory Council meetings results<br />
publication. Article 50 states that these results are confidential. For this<br />
reason Cani (2008) recommended to change this article.<br />
Conclusions<br />
The literature review suggests that different economists give different<br />
definitions on the central bank independence. But the most important thing is<br />
that they all agree when they discuss about the real independence. They<br />
measure it with different indicators but the most important is that they draw<br />
the same conclusion. Having a good law 29 on central bank is a plus but it<br />
isn’t enough. If this law is left apart than central bank isn’t independent.<br />
In the comparative analysis of <strong>South</strong>eastern Europe central banks’<br />
independence we noticed that there are a lot of problems. We analyzed four<br />
kinds of independence and we concluded that Albania has a high level of<br />
legal independence, but still there are problems with financial independence.<br />
For these reasons, we recommended some improvements.<br />
The first law on Bank of Albania was approved in 1992. It was a<br />
problematic law and it was amended 3-4 times. Nowadays, the law is<br />
relatively good, and it can guarantee the independence of the Bank of<br />
Albania. The situation with the real independence is a little bit different. One<br />
of the indicators used to measure the real independence is the governors’<br />
turnover rate. In Albania this indicator is 0.48. It is relatively high and it<br />
shows that Albania suffers from other “diseases”. These problems are<br />
mentioned in the last section of the paper and we think that there is still a lot<br />
left to do before we can say that we have a real independent central bank.<br />
29<br />
Good law is a law that guarantees the political, instruments and objective independence.<br />
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