09.11.2014 Views

SEEU Review vol. 5 Nr. 2 (pdf) - South East European University

SEEU Review vol. 5 Nr. 2 (pdf) - South East European University

SEEU Review vol. 5 Nr. 2 (pdf) - South East European University

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

<strong>SEEU</strong> <strong>Review</strong> Volume 5, No. 2, 2009<br />

members 10 . The <strong>European</strong> Central Bank members mandate is 8 years;<br />

minimum 5 years 11 and they can not be reappointed.<br />

According to the statute, the governor of a Central Bank can be dismissed<br />

only when he doesn’t accomplish his/her duties or when (s)he is a bad<br />

manager of the central bank 12 . To avoid bad management, chief executive<br />

officers must have a high level of professional qualification 13 .<br />

<strong>South</strong>eastern Europe central banks have a high level of institutional<br />

independence because these banks generally are independent from other<br />

institutions in achieving their objectives. We say “generally” because the law<br />

of the central bank in Macedonia and the law of the central bank in Serbia<br />

states that the central bank must coordinate with the respective government<br />

for the achievement of its objectives. So, these central banks are not free to<br />

state their monetary policy.<br />

<strong>South</strong>eastern <strong>European</strong> central banks match one of the conditions of the<br />

Tractate - the mandate of the governor and the mandate of Supervisory<br />

Council members is generally above 5 years, and the governor and chief<br />

executive officers must be experienced and have academic titles. The laws<br />

determine the incompatibility of the position of Supervisory Council<br />

member with other functions. Also the governor is dismissed when he<br />

commits a crime, makes fake declarations, misses the Council meetings, etc.<br />

The laws of <strong>South</strong>eastern Europe countries are somewhat problematic<br />

when we discuss about the Supervisory Council members dismissal. Some of<br />

the articles must be reduced and simplified. Financial independence is made<br />

of two components: limits to government lending and budgetary<br />

independence. Some of the countries that we are studying prohibit direct<br />

credit to the government. So, they have solved the problem of financial<br />

independence. Albania and Serbia do not prohibit direct credit to the<br />

government 14 . Croatia, Albania, Montenegro and Serbia do not prohibit<br />

indirect credit to the government 15 . Only Bosnia – Herzegovina prohibits<br />

both direct and indirect credit (they have currency board). Also to the<br />

ownership and management of the budget is a very important component. In<br />

Albania, Croatia, Macedonia and Romania the capital is owned by the state.<br />

In table 2 is given the information about the second component (budgetary<br />

independence). There can be noticed that the central banks allocate part of<br />

their profit to the reserve fund. These banks also allocate the residual profit<br />

to government budget.<br />

10<br />

11<br />

12<br />

13<br />

14<br />

15<br />

Article 108 of Tractate and article 7 of Statute<br />

Articles 11 (2) and 14 (2) of the Statute<br />

Article 14 (2) of the statute<br />

Article 112 (2) (b) of Tractate and article 11.2 of statute<br />

Direct crediting is allowed in special cases and it is well controlled<br />

Central banks can buy treasury bonds in the secondary market.<br />

57

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!