SEEU Review vol. 5 Nr. 2 (pdf) - South East European University

SEEU Review Volume 5, No. 2, 2009
for individuals. Intuitive idea behind the political conception of justice
relates directly to such a background and to the existing situation of the
modern democratic society. Such a conception, Rawls suggests, may be
supported “at least” by an “overlapping consensus” of the “opposing
philosophical, religious doctrines” inherited from the past and still having
adherents (Rawls, 1999, 390).
However, democratic thoughts of the last two centuries suffered from “a
deep disagreement” over the way of realization of the values of liberty and
equality within the basic structure of society (Rawls, 1999, 391). In thought,
this conflict can be traced back to the rival traditions attributed to Locke and
Rousseau. But, “justice as fairness”, to be composed of two principles if
justice “tries to adjudicate between these contending traditions first, by
proposing …. guidelines for how basic institutions are to realize the values
of liberty and equality, and second, by specifying a point of view from which
these principles can be seen as more appropriate … to the nature of
democratic citizens …” (Rawls, 1999, 392).
Justice as Fairness, especially TJ, aims at justifying political liberalism
through a general theory of justice for a well-ordered society. Such a society
is regulated by a public conception of justice. Its members accept the same
principles upon which the basic institutions are based. This idealisation is
based upon the observation that political theory of liberal democracy is in a
crisis and there is no agreement upon the contents of liberal democratic
institutions in terms of the values of freedom and equality of the citizens and
the institutional arrangements of these fundamental values (Lassman; 197-8).
In the theory of justice as fairness, social unity means “a system of
cooperation between free and equal persons”. Commitment to common
institutions is erected upon “their publicly accepting a political conception of
justice to regulate the basic structure of society”. Here, justice is
independently defined from the conceptions of good and prior to them. The
principles of justice put the limits on the conceptions of “goods which are
permissible” to be advanced. This relation between justice and good implies
the “priority of right”, which Rawls believes, characterizes the liberalism in
the political sense. As for the problem of stability, Rawls argues that it
relates to “overlapping consensus”, by which justice as fairness is
acknowledged. Each individual may interpret this consensus in favour of his
own comprehensive moral doctrine and accordingly overlapping consensus
will be far more stable than being indifferent to the rival values or accepting
the principle of utility and will be a peaceful compromise, reconciliation, in
the face of social forces (Rawls, 1999, 413).
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