SEEU Review vol. 5 Nr. 2 (pdf) - South East European University

Dr. Ercan Gündoğan
cooperation in the case of the basic structure of society”. Furthermore, the
difficulties above-mentioned are overcome thanks to the restrictions of
original position over the reasons for favouring one alternative as a good
alternative. The position functions as an instrument of “public reflection and
self-clarification” and plays the role of “a unifying idea by which our
considered convictions at all levels of generality are brought to bear on one
another so as to achieve greater mutual agreement and self-understanding”.
Both the characteristics of the parties and the restrictions of the veil of
ignorance, to Rawls, have no metaphysical implications about the nature of
self since self is not assumed prior to the facts about the persons and no any
essential nature independent from contingencies is offered. Rawls states that
such misunderstandings originate from the fact that representative quality of
the original position is not seen (Rawls, 1999, 402). At any time, parties can
enter into this position “simply by reasoning principles of justice in
accordance with the enumerated restrictions” (Rawls, 1999, 402-3).
Rawls suggests that the principles might be deduced from a priori
principles of reason or known intuitively. However, they would unlikely
result in the principles of justice. Rawls imagines self-interested and rational
persons, who will in time debate on the legitimate claims against their settled
institutions. Such a debate creates principles in order to evaluate and judge
complaints and practices, that is, a procedure of evaluation and judgment
which is proposed and accepted by all and is binding for future. Rawls
predicts that each person will take into account the general principles in the
face of other competing particular interests (Rawls, 1999, 53). The principles
guarantee that “the interests of others will be limited likewise” (Rawls, 1999,
54). Rawls seems to suggest a game theory, or a game theory model of
justice as fairness. In the game theories, self-interested and rational parties
accept the same rules and they try to win or at least decrease their lost. The
game presents risks, extreme benefits, reasonable targets to the parties and
also reasonable benefits if they collaborate.
Public Agreement: Now we must ask which principles are chosen in this
original position. It implies a hierarchy of different principles. The
possibility of choosing utility principle is weak since it rules out the
principle of reciprocity and the cooperation of the equals. Nobody accepts a
loss in return of a greater net balance of satisfaction. The principle of utility
also raises the problem of egoism. Rawls believes that the parties in the
original position would select “two rather different principles” (Rawls, 1971,
14).
What the parties do in such a circumstance is ‘simply the
acknowledgment of certain principles of judgment, fulfilling certain general
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